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Abstract 
The current study investigated the effects of an eight-month randomized controlled trial, 
comprising combined physical and cognitive enrichment, on measures of personal 
autobiographical memory (ABM) and theory of mind (ToM) in idiopathic Parkinson’s 
disease (PD). These patients had a non-MCI status. Research suggests that ToM and ABM 
may be impaired early in PD, prior to the emergence of other cognitive deficits. PD 
participants were randomised to an active intervention group (n=21) or passive control group 
(usual care plus frequent researcher contact; n=19), and performance at baseline and end-of-
trial was compared with an age, education and sex-matched healthy control group (HC; 
n=24). A combination of the Autobiographical Memory Interview (AMI) and Episodic 
Autobiographical Memory Interview (EAMI) was used to assess semantic and episodic 
memory, with a particular focus on the examination of sensory-perceptual and contextual 
detail associated with autonoetic episodic recall. A card sequencing False Belief story task 
assessed cognitive ToM. Overall, PD participants showed significantly impaired performance 
on both AMI and EAMI measures of episodic memory; for semantic memory, the PD group 
had poorer recall on the AMI, but this difference only emerged for later adulthood and 
especially recent memory for the EAMI measure at end-of-trial. For ToM, a significant pre-
post RCT interaction effect was found due to a low mean ToM score in the PD intervention 
group that increased to a similar mean score of both the HC and PD-passive groups at end-of-
trial. However, no other effect of intervention was found in the non-MCI PD participants. 
Although the sample size was relatively small, this study suggests that a relatively intensive 
combination of cognitive and physical exercises does not benefit PD participants prior to an 
MCI status. Further follow up is required to test whether intervention effects emerge over the 
longer term. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
1.1 Parkinson’s disease 
Idiopathic Parkinson’s disease (PD) is a progressive multisystem neurodegenerative disorder 
that currently affects approximately 10,000 New Zealanders (Myall et al., 2016). With age as 
its single most significant risk factor (Hindle, 2010), the incidence rate of PD in New Zealand 
is increasing as the population grows older. The cardinal motor symptoms of PD are 
bradykinesia, rigidity, slow and rhythmic resting tremor, and postural instability (Halliday & 
McCann, 2009). These symptoms provide its differential diagnosis. However, the debilitation 
associated with PD goes beyond motor impairment to include a broad and heterogeneous 
spectrum of non-motor symptoms, some of which antedate diagnosis and all of which 
become more prevalent as PD progresses (Aarsland, Andersen, Larsen, & Lolk, 2003; 
Jellinger, 2011). This can include disruption to autonomic and sensory functions, the sleep-
wake cycle, rapid eye movement sleep, and neuropsychiatric symptoms (Lim, Fox, & Lang, 
2009; Poewe, 2008). Many patients experience depression, sensory pain, hyposmia, 
orthostatic hypotension, constipation, incontinence and genital dysfunction (Poewe, 2008). 
Falls, abnormal sweating, dysphagia, dribbling, vivid dreams and restless legs, experiences of 
apathy, anhedonia and hallucinosis are also part of the diverse symptomatic profile of PD 
(Hindle, 2010; Jellinger, 2011; Poewe, 2008). For many, among the most distressing and 
disabling of PD symptoms is the experience of progressive cognitive decline, which often has 
a more severe impact on quality of life than its motor symptoms. Although time courses are 
highly variable, dementia (PDD) within 20 years is the prognosis for 80% of PD patients 
(Aarsland et al., 2003; Buter et al., 2008; Hely, Reid, Adena, Halliday, & Morris, 2008; 
Wood et al., 2016). 
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 The neuropathological underpinnings of PD symptoms primarily involve the gradual 
deposition perhaps over many decades, of abnormal aggregations of misfolded alpha-
synuclein proteins, known as Lewy bodies and neurites, in the brain. These result in synaptic 
and cellular loss. Alzheimer’s related beta-amyloid and hyper-phosphorylated tau pathology 
is also suggested to be a contributing factor (Jellinger, 2011). Over time, a cascade of 
disruptions to cortico-striato-thalamocortical and cortico-cortical circuitry (Jellinger, 2011), 
caused by diffusion of Lewy pathology, affect multiple systems and give rise to the plethora 
of symptoms seen in PD. The Braak staging model (Figure 1.1), depicts Lewy pathology as 
spreading predictably from the anterior olfactory nucleus through the midbrain and across the 
neocortex (Hawkes, Del Tredici, & Braak, 2010; Hindle, 2010; Zapiec et al., 2017). The 
pathology is more prevalent in neurons with long, thin and poorly myelinated axons (Braak, 
Ghebremedhin, Rüb, Bratzke, & Del Tredici, 2004). These features include the dopaminergic 
striatal projection neurons in the substantia nigra pars compacta (SNc). The degeneration of 
these cells are the primary cause of PD motor symptoms, as the loss of this neurotransmitter 
in the striatum affects dopamine-dependent priming of neurons associated with incoming 
neocortical messages (Curtis, 2018). Cognitive deficits and dementia are associated with 
Lewy-induced cellular and synaptic degeneration primarily in many structures including 
brain stem nuclei, limbic structures and cerebral cortex. There is also reduced cortical 





Figure 1.1: Braak staging of spread of pathology, from symptom onset to end of disease course. 
Pathological staging is indicated by 1 – 6 numbering. Prodromal symptoms are indicated to the left of 
clinical onset, with major features based on Hoehhn & Yahr staging to the right. The extreme left 
hand side symbols represent possible causative agents of genetic mutation (upper) or viral infection: 
Abbreviations: CA2 = Ammon’s horn second section; CN X = cranial nerve motor component; RF = 
reticular formation; CN amygdala central subnucleus; Meynert’s n = basal nucleus of Meynert; PPN = 
pedunculopontine tegmental nucleus; TEC = transentorhinal cortex. Reprinted with permission of 
Hawkes et al. (2010). 
1.2 Parkinson’s disease and cognitive impairment 
The profile of cognitive impairment in PD is characterized by slow and non-insidious decline 
across one or more cognitive domains including attention, executive function, visuospatial 
function, memory and language. Factors associated with progression to dementia include 
older age of disease onset, greater severity of motor symptoms, longer disease duration and 
advanced disease stage (Aarsland & Kurz, 2010; Wood et al., 2016). About 25-30% of non-
demented Parkinson’s patients have PD-MCI (Litvan et al., 2011; Wood et al., 2016). PD-
MCI can be defined as a state of cognitive performance that is lower than expected for an 
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individual’s age and level of education, but which is not severe enough to interfere with 
activities of everyday living (Ritchie, 2004). Although dementia is not a predetermined 
outcome and some PD-MCI patients may even improve, PD-MCI patients have a high risk of 
conversion when compared with cognitively unimpaired PD patients (Goldman, Aggarwal, & 
Schroeder, 2015; Wood et al., 2016). 
 Neuroimaging evidence has also shown that some cognitively unimpaired individuals 
with PD show physical alterations in the brain prior to any observable cognitive deterioration. 
This subset is at greater risk of future cognitive decline than those who do not show these 
volumetric changes (Mak et al., 2015). Additionally, among patients who have presented 
clinically as cognitively unimpaired but who have gone on to develop MCI within four years, 
a discrete risk signature has retrospectively been identified through lower z scores across 
selected neuropsychological tests (Myall et al., 2015). Given this neuroimaging and cognitive 
evidence that a tangible stage of risk can be identified before any overt indications of 
cognitive decline, there is clearly a degree of risk even prior to a PD-MCI diagnosis in some 
patients. Thus PD with pre-MCI risk may be a suitable identifier of the cognitively vulnerable 
patients, and represents a critical time window for early interventions that aim to slow or 
prevent its further progression.  
 Unlike the responsiveness of motor symptoms to dopamine replacement therapy, 
many cognitive symptoms in PD persist despite optimal medical management. There is little 
by way of pharmacologic therapy that can support preservation of cognitive function (Bloem, 
de Vries, & Ebersbach, 2015; Lim et al., 2009). Instead, research literature suggests that 
possible ways to slow cognitive decline include taking regular exercise. This may maintain 
healthy blood supply to the brain (Hahn & Andel, 2011), as well as encourage cognitive and 
social stimulation. There is substantial interest in nonpharmacological, ‘lifestyle’ 
interventions that may slow progression of cognitive impairment in PD. In the AD field, there 
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is already evidence that cognitive and physical activity is associated with a reduced risk for 
cognitive decline (Hindle, Petrelli, Clare, & Kalbe, 2013). Initial trials of aerobic exercise in 
PD have produced evidence of cognitive improvement (Hindle et al., 2015). It has therefore 
been suggested that promotion of brain resilience through exercise or cognition-focused 
interventions, may help to delay or even prevent the onset and later progression of 
impairment in PD (Hindle et al., 2013). However, there is currently insufficient evidence 
regarding the benefits of such interventions in PD and a lack of well-controlled studies 
(Heyn, Abreu, & Ottenbacher, 2004; Hindle et al., 2013; Lautenschlager, Cox, Flicker, & et 
al., 2008). The current PD Enrichment Study was designed to establish preliminary evidence, 
through a randomized controlled trial, of whether an extended non-pharmacological treatment 
regime comprising weekly cognitive and physical exercises would help to maintain cognition 
and motor function in PD. The current study was conducted with a participant group of well-
characterized early-stage pre-MCI PD patients assessed as cognitively normal and assessed 
risk of progression to MCI. The intervention package included cognitive tasks that aimed to 
activate neural regions associated with the default mode network (DMN) as well as other 
large scale cognitive brain networks. The DMN is notable in supporting autobiographical 
memory and theory of mind processes. The aim of the current thesis project was to therefore 
examine the effects of intervention on performance in measures of autobiographical memory 
and theory of mind within this cohort and a group of matched HC participants.  
1.3 The Default Mode Network 
The default mode network (DMN) refers to an interconnected and anatomically defined 
network of brain regions that are metabolically active when the brain is at rest and engaged in 
internally-directed modes of thought. It becomes relatively deactivated when attention is 
focused on externally-directed tasks of the immediate present, which activate other large 
neural networks (Andrews-Hanna, 2012; Buckner, Andrews-Hanna, & Schacter, 2008; 
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Gusnard & Raichle, 2001; Minoshima et al., 2004). The evolutionary adaptive utility of the 
DMN appears to include using past experiences to anticipate and prepare for the future and 
alterative scenarios, as well as facilitating successful social interactions and cooperation as a 
group-oriented species (Tessitore et al., 2012). 
  Activation of the DMN, as observed in fMRI, occurs when the mind’s attention shifts 
from the immediate present and engages in a broad range of personally and motivationally 
salient social, emotional and mnemonic processes. These processes include recollection of 
episodic autobiographical information from the past, as well as prospection of contextually 
realistic future events (Andrews-Hanna, 2012; Andrews-Hanna, Reidler, Huang, & Buckner, 
2010; Buckner & Carroll, 2007; Schacter, Addis, & Buckner, 2008; Spreng & Grady, 2009; 
Spreng, Stevens, Chamberlain, Gilmore, & Schacter, 2010; Tessitore et al., 2012). This 
‘awareness of one’s protracted existence across subjective time’ (Buckner & Carroll, 2007, p. 
50), is referred to as autonoetic consciousness in autobiographical memory research. It is 
characterized by rich contextual detail across several sensory-perceptual modalities (Buckner 
& Carroll, 2007; Irish, Lawlor, O'Mara, & Coen, 2008; Tulving, 1985). Regions of the DMN 
are also activated when conceiving the thoughts and feelings of oneself and others, as well as 
during some forms of topographical or spatial navigation (Buckner et al., 2008; Buckner & 
Carroll, 2007). 
 A model presented by Andrews-Hanna (2012; Figure 1.2), portrays the DMN as a 
collection of subsystems and hubs, in which the dorsomedial PFC (dMPFC) subsystem and 
medial temporal lobe (MTL) subsystem serve social cognitive and recollection-based 
operations respectively. These two subsystems converge on core hubs within the posterior 
cingulate cortex (PCC) and medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC), which appear important to the 
overall integration of the subsystems network. The MTL subsystem comprises the MTL, 
retrosplenial cortex, posterior cingulate cortex, posterior inferior parietal lobe and mPFC 
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regions, as well as the hippocampus and parahippocampus (Buckner et al., 2008; Cabeza & 
St Jacques, 2007; Spreng & Grady, 2009; Svoboda, McKinnon, & Levine, 2006). The dorsal 
medial subsystem recruits the dmPFC, precuneus, mPFC, temporoparietal junction, lateral 
temporal cortex and temporal poles (Frith & Frith, 2003; Tessitore et al., 2012). 
 
Figure 1.2: Proposed functional-anatomic organization of the major subsystems and hubs of the 
default mode network. Arrows represent approximate strength of connectivity between components. 
Reprinted with permission from Andrews-Hanna (2012). 
 Studies of age-related disruption to the DMN and the other large-scale brain networks 
indicate that a degradation of network connectivity is a natural part of the ageing process 
(Andrews-Hanna et al., 2007). However, in individuals with PD, there may be advanced 
reduction in functional integrity of the DMN that may in particular contribute to development 
of early cognitive impairment. In early stage (H&Y 1-2; Goetz et al., 2004), cognitively 
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unimpaired PD patients (as defined by z scores that do not fall below the population mean in 
any three cognitive domains), neuroimaging data has shown functional disruption of the 
DMN to occur in the right medial temporal lobe and bilateral inferior parietal cortices, in the 
absence of significant structural differences, compared with controls (Tessitore et al., 2012). 
Similar DMN-associated hypometabolic patterns have been observed in cognitively 
unimpaired non-PD patients who carry a genetic loading for Alzheimer’s disease (Buckner et 
al., 2008). Overall, there is evidence to support the possibility that the DMN is vulnerable to 
disturbance even prior to emergence of cognitive or structural deficits in PD. This carries 
important implications for therapeutic interventions that seek to foster brain resilience in the 
very earliest clinical stages of PD, and efforts to slow progression to PD-MCI and PDD.  
1.4 Theory of Mind 
Theory of Mind (ToM) is a complex domain of social cognition referring to the ability to 
infer emotional and mental states of others, in order to understand and predict their 
behaviour. Interpreting other people’s emotions, beliefs, intentions and desires enables the 
forming and maintenance of social bonds and successful daily interactions (Bodden et al., 
2010). Deficits in these abilities can go on to severely impact social engagement and quality 
of life. 
 Neuroimaging research over the last decade has identified the existence of a 
distributed neural network underpinning ToM abilities. Regions of this network include the 
posterior superior temporal sulci (pSTS), temporo-parietal junctions (TPJ), precuneus, 
posterior cingulate cortex and the prefrontal cortex (PFC; Poletti, Enrici, & Adenzato, 2012). 
Particular emphasis is made of the contribution of the prefrontal and frontal brain regions to 
cognitive and affective subcomponents of ToM (Poletti et al., 2012; Roca et al., 2010). 
Cognitive ToM can be understood as the ability to infer other people’s beliefs, intentions and 
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desires. Affective ToM refers to the ability to infer and empathize with other people’s 
emotional states and feelings (Nobis et al., 2017). 
 A model by Shamay-Tsoory and colleagues (2005; cited by Poletti et al. (2012) 
proposes that cognitive and affective sub-processes of ToM operate within separate systems 
mostly housed within the PFC, with more posterior brain regions involved in background 
operations (see Figure 1.3). In this model, the ventromedial PFC is recruited to affective 
ToM, and the dorsolateral PFC to cognitive ToM. Although frontal-lobe underpinnings of 
affective ToM are well-established by lesion and neuroimaging evidence (Bodden et al., 
2010), the regions supporting cognitive ToM are not clearly elucidated. Key evidence for the 
role of the dorsolateral PFC in cognitive but not affective ToM abilities was shown by Kalbe 
et al. (2010) using transcranial magnetic stimulation. Additional imaging evidence also 
indicates a role of the dorsomedial PFC in cognitive-based mentalizing amongst other 
complex and more abstracted processes (Baetens, Ma, & Van Overwalle, 2017; Bzdok et al., 
2012; Molenberghs, Johnson, Henry, & Mattingley, 2016; Schurz, Radua, Aichhorn, Richlan, 
& Perner, 2014). 
 Regions of overlap between ToM and DMN processes include the dorsal and ventral 
medial prefrontal cortices, posterior cingulate cortex, precuneus and temporo-parietal 
junctions (Andrews-Hanna, 2012; Spreng & Grady, 2009). Whilst the ventromedial PFC 
forms a node of the DMN, the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex is more strongly associated with 
the central executive brain network. However, this network is also a target for cognitive 
stimulation in the PD Enrichment study. Characterized behaviourally by symptoms of 
executive dysfunction, the central executive network also shows abnormal fMRI activity in 
early-stage PD (Sala et al., 2017). 
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Figure 1.3: A frontal lobe model of the relationship between two neural systems for cognitive and 
affective ToM processing, with supporting posterior regions. Reprinted with permission of Poletti et 
al. (2012). 
 Theory of Mind in Parkinson’s disease: literature review 1.4.1
The discovery of affective and cognitive subcomponents of ToM was facilitated by the 
development of several types of tests that sought to examine people’s beliefs about other’s 
beliefs, about other’s feelings, or both (Poletti et al., 2012), across different clinical 
populations and in normal human development. The following literature review describes 
four of the most commonly used tests used in studies published between 2000 and 2010 to 
evaluate the neuropsychological features of ToM impairment in non-demented PD patients, 
screened by a range of cognitive measures (Table 1-1). References to Hoehn & Yahr clinical 
staging is based on recommendations made by the Movement Disorder Society Task Force 
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(Goetz et al., 2004; Poletti et al., 2012), which defines early H&Y stages as 1, 1.5 and 2; 
moderate as 2, 2.5 and 3; and advanced as H&Y stages 4 and 5.  
 Reading the Mind in the Eyes (RME) task is a measure of affective ToM abilities. 
This task was one of the cognitive exercises in the current PD Enrichment study, which 
sought to examine whether a non-pharmacological treatment regime comprising weekly 
cognitive and physical exercises would help to maintain cognition in PD. In the RME task, 
participants are typically presented with 27-36 images of human eye regions and must name 
which of several basic emotions the eyes are conveying (Baron-Cohen, Jolliffe, Mortimore, 
& Robertson, 1997; Poletti et al., 2012). Of six studies that used the RME task in PD patients, 
four reported preserved performances in medicated PD patients up to moderate clinical stages 
(H&Y2.5) and mean disease duration of 10.2 years (Euteneuer et al., 2009; Péron et al., 2010; 
Péron et al., 2009; Roca et al., 2010). Another two studies reported impaired performance 
(Bodden et al., 2010; Mimura, Oeda, & Kawamura, 2006) in non-demented PD patients 
screened with the Mini Mental State Examination (MMSE cutoff >26; Folstein, Folstein, & 
McHugh, 1975) and Parkinson Neuropsychometric Dementia Assessment (PANDA; Kalbe et 
al., 2008). However, Mimura & colleagues (2006) noted that both PD and HC scored 
relatively highly overall. In the study by Bodden et al., (2010), the younger age of the HC 
compared to PDs (mean age 58.7years, versus 63.7 years respectively) may have been an 
influencing factor as RME performance appear to decline even in healthy ageing (Pardini & 
Nichelli, 2009). Additionally, a similar mean performance to Bodden et al. (2010) was 
reported by (Euteneuer et al., 2009) which found no significant difference in performance of 
PD patients compared to HC. Overall, the RME task indicates that affective ToM abilities 
may be preserved in PD, up to ten years beyond diagnosis. 
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Table 1-1. Characteristics of theory of mind in Parkinson's disease studies. The order is chronological. 
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 Another type of ToM task is the Faux Pas Recognition task, which was also included 
in the cognitive stimulation package of the PD Enrichment study (see Appendix C for an 
example). This task is a measure of both affective and cognitive ToM abilities, and is often 
presented as a series of 10-20 cartoon, verbal or written stories which contain either a faux 
pas or minor conflict which serves as a control condition (Stone, Baron-Cohen, & Knight, 
1998). Participants first identify whether anyone said or did anything that would constitute a 
social transgression, which represents the affective component. They then answer a further 
set of questions that require inference of the characters’ mental states, which represents the 
cognitive component. All three studies that used this task reported unimpaired performance 
of early-stage PD patients in the affective component of the FPR task compared with HC 
(Kawamura & Koyama, 2007; Péron et al., 2009; Roca et al., 2010). For the cognitive aspect, 
two studies reported impaired performance in early-stage non-MCI PD patients (Kawamura 
& Koyama, 2007; Roca et al., 2010); whilst another reported emergence of impairment only 
at more advanced clinical stages (Péron et al., 2009). However, the use of an abridged version 
of the task in Péron et al. (2009), and not the earlier two, may have influenced the results 
observed. Overall, findings from studies using the Faux Pas Recognition test suggest the 
presence of cognitive ToM deficits and preservation of affective ToM in early-stage PD. 
 The false belief paradigm is also well known in the cognitive ToM literature. First 
order false belief tasks measure a participant’s ability to infer a character’s (mistaken) belief 
about the state of the world, which is different from their own (true) belief (Martins-Junior, 
Sanvicente-Vieira, Grassi-Oliveira, & Brietzke, 2011). Higher or second-order false belief 
tasks are more cognitively challenging and typically require the participant to infer what one 
character believes another to character to (falsely) believe (Baron-Cohen, Leslie, & Frith, 
1985; Poletti et al., 2012). Adult versions of the task usually involve reading or listening to a 
story and then answering test question verbally. 
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 Two studies reported impaired first order performance in early stage PD patients 
(Mengelberg & Siegert, 2003; Saltzman et al., 2000). However, one of these studies also 
employed a deception task and perspective-taking task. These tasks involve for example, 
detecting deception in an examiner’s actions to correctly guess the eggcup under which a 
paper clip is hidden. Another is showing a whole picture, then hiding half of it to create 
visual ambiguity and requiring a participant to state what they think others might think the 
picture actually depicts. In both of these latter tasks, the PD group showed preserved 
performance compared with HC (Mengelberg & Siegert, 2003; Saltzman et al., 2000). 
However, the heterogeneity inherent to the administration of these tasks meant that variation 
in cognitive loads not specific to ToM may have been differentially recruited to each study 
(Saltzman et al., 2000). Indeed, across all types of tests, there is a need to consider variation 
in attentional and working memory components required of more abstract written and verbal 
tasks (Brüne, 2005). This is highlighted in the study by Saltzman et al. (2000) which reported 
an association between ToM and certain measures of executive function (five point verbal 
fluency); and contrasts with the Faux Pas Recognition results reported by Roca et al. (2010), 
in which no relationship was found between measures of executive functioning and cognitive 
ToM. However the earlier association may have actually reflected performance on domain-
general processes that support both executive function and ToM, particularly since the false 
belief task used by Saltzman et al. (2000) controlled for memory problems but not for 
comprehension and general reasoning abilities.  
 In recognizing the importance of controlling for non-ToM cognitive loadings, 
Mengelberg and Siegert (2003) employed a visual false belief card sequencing task in which 
participants reorganized 18 sets of picture cards into stories that showed a logical sequence of 
events (Langdon et al., 1997). The task included a false belief condition plus conditions that 
checked for deficits in sequencing, social understanding and complex reasoning abilities. In 
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addition to the first order false belief story task (reported earlier), participants also completed 
second order tasks and read short passages that required inference of mental states or physical 
causation (Poletti et al., 2012). In the short passage and card sequencing tasks, non-demented 
PD patients showed significantly poorer ToM performance compared with age-matched HC 
but spared performance in the conditions that did not measure ToM, suggesting presence of a 
specific ToM deficit. Both PD and control groups performed comparably on the more 
challenging second order task, with slightly worse performance in the PD group (p=.09). 
However, the median score of zero across both groups suggests that the task was simply too 
hard and possible floor effects may have disguised differences in ability between the two 
groups (Mengelberg & Siegert, 2003). 
 Overall, results of these studies suggest that when careful control protocols are place, 
impairments in cognitive ToM in PD emerge in the earliest clinical stages, and possibly prior 
to other cognitive impairments. In contrast, the capacity to infer and empathize with other 
people’s emotional states may be preserved ten years beyond diagnosis (Nobis et al., 2017; 
Péron et al., 2009; Poletti, Enrici, Bonuccelli, & Adenzato, 2011; Roca et al., 2010). This 
conclusion may be related to the early pathology of PD. The progressive depletion of 
nigrostriatal dopamine disturbs fronto-thalamo-striatal circuits, which result in 
hypostimulation of the PFC. In the earliest stages of PD, the spatio-temporal progression of 
dopamine loss into the striatum is characterized by up to 90% of dopamine depletion in an 
area of the caudate nucleus engaged in the dorsolateral fronto-striatal circuit. This may be 
why cognitive ToM and other executive functions are impaired earliest. Affective ToM may 
be relatively spared until more medial portions of the PFC become destabilized by the 
cortical dispersion of lewy pathology at later stages (Poletti et al., 2012). 
 On the basis of neuropsychological and neurobiological evidence that cognitive ToM 
shows signs of impairment in early-stage PD, a group of 20 well-characterized, at-risk non-
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MCI PD patients were assessed on this domain as part of their baseline assessment for 
inclusion in the current longitudinal study (Nicolson, 2016). Participant overlap occurred 
because the cohort used in this preliminary work represented the first 20 PD participants 
recruited to the PD Enrichment trial, which sought to encourage neural reserve in vulnerable 
PD brain areas at the earliest stage possible. Patients were assessed for cognitive ToM 
performance using a card sequencing task by Langdon et al. (1997), alongside 15 age and 
education-matched HC participants who were also included as controls in the current study. 
This particular task was selected because of its relative prowess in isolating cognitive ToM 
performance from more general executive-type impairments (Brüne, 2005; Mengelberg & 
Siegert, 2003). The recruitment of working memory is also minimal in this task compared 
with others types of measures. In a replication of earlier findings by Mengelberg and Siegert 
(2003), this preliminary work by Nicolson (2016) showed that PD participants performed 
significantly worse in the false belief condition compared with HC, even when controlling for 
the influences of age, sex and education. No differences were found between the two groups 
in conditions representing more general cognitive abilities. The card sorting task by Langdon 
et al. (1997) therefore appears to carry utility as a tool for examining the effects of an 
intervention which is designed to stimulate and support vulnerable PD brain regions that 
engage the DMN, central executive and other major brain networks. 
1.5 Autobiographical memory 
Autobiographical memory (ABM) represents the mind’s inventory of information and 
experiences collected over the lifespan. Beyond its utility in navigating the practicalities of 
everyday life, ABM is important for the construction of personal identity, self-coherence and 
self-continuity (Piolino, Desgranges, Benali, & Eustache, 2002). The ABM brain network 
overlaps with the DMN and involves the frontal and medial temporal lobes including the 
hippocampus and parahippocampus, plus ventral parietal cortices, posterior cingulate cortex 
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and secondary association areas distributed across the neocortex (Cabeza & St Jacques, 
2007). Conceptually, the ABM is distinguished into personal episodic and semantic forms of 
personal memory. Personal episodic ABM refers to memory for personally-experienced 
events, with an episodic memory said to contain contextually specific details about an event 
or incident, including its location in space and time (Piolino et al., 2003; Tulving, 1985, 
2001; Tulving, Schacter, McLachlan, & Moscovitch, 1988). Personal semantic ABM refers 
to the vast knowledge base of facts stored about one’s life, which are recalled independently 
of specific contextual encoding recollections. Examples include birthdates and personal 
telephone numbers (Tulving et al., 1988). The conceptual distinction between semantic and 
episodic forms of ABM is represented by hierarchical models in which memory knowledge is 
held at three levels of abstraction: lifetime periods, general events and event-specific 
knowledge (Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000; Irish et al., 2011a). Consciousness is 
inherently engaged as the self, which ‘works’ these levels in a constant cyclical process of 
memory encoding and retrieval (Levine, Svoboda, Hay, Winocur, & Moscovitch, 2002). 
Semantic-based lifetime periods reflect the broadest level of abstraction and comprise general 
knowledge about distinct themes in a person’s life (e.g. schooling, career, later adulthood, 
and retirement years). These broad time periods provide scaffolding for less abstracted, 
general events which are grouped as clusters of repeated or thematically related events, such 
as “first-time” achievements, or playing netball for the school team. These general events in 
turn are portals to event-specific knowledge, which refers to the detailed visual, emotional 
and sensory-perceptual representations of an individual episodic event (Levine et al., 2002; 
Piolino, Desgranges, & Eustache, 2009). The high-fidelity sensory-perceptual episodic details 
of event specific knowledge tend to fade quickly unless they are part of particularly 
meaningful events (Conway, 2005). Retrieval of contextual details are also sensitive to the 
neocortical changes implicated in normal ageing, regardless of remoteness (Levine et al., 
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2002). The loss of specificity and detail may be compensated for by expansion of ‘general 
event’ semanticised memory stores (Piolino et al., 2006). It is through these more abstract, 
semantic-based levels of personal memory, that self-knowledge and identity may be 
preserved over the life course (Levine et al., 2002).  
 Retrieval of an event with the ‘event-specific knowledge’ level of contextual detail 
can often be accompanied by the subjective ‘re-living’ of the original event. This 
phenomenon is thought to be mediated by autonoetic consciousness, which is associated with 
regions of the DMN as highlighted previously (Irish et al., 2011a; Irish et al., 2008; Piolino et 
al., 2002; Piolino et al., 2009). Current research on ABM encourages close examination of 
the sensory-perceptual contextual details and especially the presence of vivid visual imagery, 
which is almost always involved in the subjective experience of remembering and is 
considered to represent a truly episodic memory (Irish et al., 2008; Piolino et al., 2006). 
 Autobiographical memory in Parkinson’s disease: literature review 1.5.1
Research into ABM in normal aging has shown that age-related decline is more pronounced 
in episodic than semantic autobiographical recall (Levine et al., 2002; Piolino et al., 2002). 
Naturally, ABM is impaired in AD (e.g. Piolino et al. (2003); Starkstein, Boller, and Garau 
(2005)). Personal autobiographical memory in PD has not been as widely researched (Sagar, 
Cohen, Sullivan, Corkin, & Growdon, 1988; Smith, 1982), although deficits in episodic 
memory for public events and in source memory tasks have been reported (Gabrieli, Singh, 
Stebbins, and Goetz (1996); Johnson, Pollard, Vernon, Tomes, and Jog (2005); as cited by 
Souchay and Smith (2013)). To the author’s knowledge, to date, only four studies have 
examined memory for personal episodic events and personal facts (Table 1-2). Two studies 
employed free recall and cue-word techniques. Cue-word methods involve providing the first 
event that comes to mind in response to a word cue, and then dating that event. The 
distribution of events across the lifespan is then compared (Piolino et al., 2002). In the 
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earliest study (Sagar et al., 1988), 23 PD patients (3 with PD-D and 20 non-demented) were 
given four minutes to provide detailed events from any lifetime period in response to ten 
high-frequency generic cues (e.g. tree, boy, bird, car). Participants were then spontaneously 
retested for recall 24 hours later. HC produced detailed specific events on the first day which 
were robustly reproduced the second day both with and without the aide of cues. The PD 
group produced comparatively fewer events on the first day, and showed a deficit in recalling 
these same memories on day two without cues. The detail of the previous day was restored 
when participants were prompted with generic and event specific cues (e.g. ‘onyx’). Analyses 
across episodic epochs yielded unclear findings, with some PD patients recalling more 
memories from the most recent life period and others having a higher frequency of recall 
from remote periods. However, the impaired performance of the PD group was clearly 
characterized by deficits in recalling time-specific events, with events tending to be 
temporally generalized across related episodes. These findings suggested over-generality to 
be a key feature of ABM in PD.  
 Smith, Souchay, and Conway (2010) gained a similar impression in a study 
administering a modified version of the ‘autobiographical fluency task’ (Dritschel, Williams, 
Baddeley, & Nimmo-Smith, 1992) given to 16 PD and 16 healthy older controls. This task 
examines memory for both personal events and semantic recall of personal facts. Participants 
were given two minutes to recall as many names of non-related people (constituting semantic 
facts) as they could over five life periods, without repeating any names. They were also given 
two minutes to recall and briefly describe as many personal events as possible. Events were 
classified as specific if they occurred within 24 hours and contained some aspects of event-
specific knowledge-type detail, or as generalized if they lasted longer than 24 hours or were 
events that fused into a narrative. PD patients recalled as many names as the older adult 
controls but produced fewer personal events overall. A gentle temporal gradient was 
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Table 1-2. Studies researching personal autobiographical memory in Parkinson's disease. The order is chronological. 
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observed in that both groups produced fewer specific events in more recent life periods, 
which was significantly more pronounced in the PD group compared to controls for the last 
two life periods (within the last five years, and within the last 12 months). Similar patterns 
have been observed in tests of recall for public events, where PD patients tend to show 
greater impairment in recalling and dating events during more recent decades (Sagar et al., 
1988). Furthermore, when free recall for public events is compared with cued and recognition 
conditions (Venneri et al., 1997), the graduated levels of performance observed associate 
with degree of task difficulty, suggesting that recall deficits may stem from a failure in 
retrieval (Smith et al., 2010). 
 Building on these observations, Souchay and Smith (2013) sought to examine 
whether degree of cue ambiguity could influence retrieval in personal ABM, as it appeared to 
do in recall for public events. In an adaptation of their previous study, 16 cognitively 
unimpaired older adults with PD and 16 older controls were given three minutes to recall 
memories associated with five different time periods, and generated short titles for each 
memory. Participants were later asked to retrieve the same memories across three sequential 
conditions: free recall, in response to generic time cues, and in response to the self-generated 
cues. The performance of the PD group was impaired relative to the control group when 
retrieving the same memories in the free recall and general cue phases, but showed 
equivalency in performance when self-generated cues were used. This finding suggested 
retrieval of personal events may be the origin of impairment. Personally relevant cues may 
initiate a direct route to retrieving a memory that is not available to more generic cues, that 
instead requires a more cognitively demanding iterative search process (Souchay & Smith, 
2013). More broadly, the evidence from cue-task assessments suggest an ABM deficit to be 
present in cognitively-normal PD, which is characterized by over-generality and difficulty 
recalling specific memories compared with healthy aged controls. There are however 
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methodological limitations to cue-based techniques including the artificial demands of the 
task, as people are required to produce a personal memory from a cue that may not hold 
much relevance to experiences in their lives (Piolino et al., 2002). Assessment of recall for 
personal facts is also constrained by frequency measures that use single-category examples 
(e.g. names of non-related people) as measures of overall semantic memory performance 
rather than a broader range of knowledge categories. On account of these limitations, 
contemporary ABM research in older adults has shifted from frequency-based, cue-word 
assessments to examination of episodic detail and quality of content, and measures of 
semantic memory that contain more than one type of fact (Piolino et al., 2006). 
 Initial work as part of the current study employed the Autobiographical Memory 
Interview (AMI) to examine episodic and semantic recall in 20 pre-MCI Parkinson’s patients 
and 15 healthy age and education-matched controls (Kopelman, Wilson, & Baddeley, 1989; 
Nicolson, 2016). The AMI is one of the most widely-used measures of ABM in the existing 
literature, and was developed to negate the limitations of cue-word methods and 
accommodate assessment in neuropsychological settings, where episodic memory retrieval 
has long been regarded as a reliable neuropsychological marker of AD (Irish, Lawlor, 
O’Mara, & Coen, 2010; Piolino et al., 2002). The AMI’s testing format is divided into a 
semantic schedule and an episodic schedule which covers three age periods (childhood, early 
adult and recent life). Memory for personal facts is measured using questions based on 
general knowledge (names of teachers, doctors, dates and places). The episodic schedule 
assesses the quality of nine autobiographical incidents divided across the three time periods. 
Participants are required to provide an event in response to a specific theme (e.g. incident at 
primary school, incident at one’s own wedding, an incident involving doctors or care staff). 
Specific cues are given if participants cannot think of an event (e.g. a day out with a teacher; 
meeting your spouse). Scoring uses a content based approach, with a maximum of three 
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points awarded per event according to three main criteria, namely “what”, “where” and 
“when”. If all three elements are present, the event is considered to reflect retrieval from 
episodic memory (Irish et al., 2008).  
 Findings by Nicolson (2016) using the AMI showed semantic memory performance 
to be similar between the PD and control groups with both scoring highly across all time 
periods. The PD group performed more poorly in episodic memory recall across all three 
time periods compared with HC, showing a consistent deficit in detail recalled. Post-hoc 
analyses showed the PD group produced significantly relatively fewer childhood events 
compared with the most recent five years of life, which supported some earlier findings 
(Smith et al., 2010); but not all, such as those where PD performance yielded no clear trend at 
all (Sagar et al., 1988). Overall, these preliminary findings using the AMI indicate personal 
episodic memory deficits to be present in some cognitively normal PD patients when 
compared with a well-matched control group.  
 Although it is one of the most well-established interviews used in the AM literature, 
some limitations persist with certain aspects of the AMI’s testing format. Age related changes 
in PD memory content are not yet well characterized, and the exclusion of the decades 
between middle life and recent life status in the AMI may restrict the extent of its sensitivity 
to performance gradients across the life span. Additionally, the episodic ABM schedule uses 
a three-point ordinal rating scale to score events described in their spatio-temporal context. 
Awarding the maximum three points for an event is considered to reflect an episodic AM. 
However, it is possible to rebuild personal events from semantic memory without actually re-
experiencing sensory-perceptual details that make a memory episodic (Piolino et al., 2006). 
Therefore the AMI episodic schedule is vulnerable to semantic contamination because its 
rating scale is unable to clearly discriminate between specific and more general levels of 
recall. The risk of ceiling effects across semantic and episodic schedules also cannot be ruled 
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out in cognitively normal populations (Piolino et al., 2002). This was a concern noted by 
Nicolson (2016, personal communication), the researcher who previously administrated the 
AMI at baseline in many of the cognitively unimpaired PD cohort tested in the current study. 
However, although mean scores were high, the AMI was still sensitive enough to discern 
impaired episodic memory recall in the PD cohort compared with HC. 
 Other tests, such as the Autobiographical Interview by Levine et al. (2002), collapse 
the semantic and episodic memory distinction as far as schedule format is concerned. 
Participants are invited to produce specific personal memories that occur across each of five 
different life periods across the life span, which are then audio recorded and transcribed for 
detailed analysis of content. Scoring involves analyzing events across several subcategories 
of detail that are proposed to reflect episodic re-experiencing of an event; including 
environmental, spatial, temporal, perceptual, sensory, emotional and metacognitive details. 
These details are separated from information containing semantic facts or repeated 
information extraneous to the main event. In comparison, the Episodic Autobiographical 
Memory Interview (EAMI; Irish et al., 2008) retains the AMI’s semantic and episodic dual-
schedule approach but also invites personal memories that contain specific details relating to 
event, time and place which are later transcribed for component analysis and scoring. 
Emphasis is placed on examining the presence of contextual details across several discrete 
phenomenological categories of detail which are considered integral to the experience of 
episodic recall (Irish et al., 2008; Irish et al., 2010; Levine et al., 2002). The appeal of the 
EAMI is the checklist approach, which allows a high level of contextual detail to be probed 
methodically and with consistency (Irish et al., 2010; Moscovitch, Yaschyshyn, Ziegler, & 
Nadel, 2000). Hence the EAMI was used at end of trial testing in the current study. 
 Within the AMI a number of episodic enquiries are structured around specific topics. 
For example, an episodic item from the Early Adult Life time period asks participants to 
25 
recall the first time they met someone new. The most recent life period focuses on present 
and past engagement with hospitals and care institutions. The AMI was validated using 
amnesic patients of various clinical diagnoses (Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000; Kopelman 
et al., 1989; Piolino et al., 2002), and in this population such themes would be appropriately 
specific. However, as with the cue word method (Piolino et al., 2002), they may not carry 
over to the experiences of more active, relatively unimpaired populations. Incorporation of 
generic themes may accommodate a broader spectrum of experiences than the AMI 
facilitates, and thereby increase the likelihood that participants produce memories 
exemplifying their recall ability within a given life period. The EAMI negates the use of 
specific themes for episodic event recall, but offers cues if an event is not spontaneously 
forthcoming (Irish et al., 2008). In doing this, the EAMI incorporates adaptations of themes 
used in an autobiographical memory interview by Piolino et al. (2002); Piolino et al. (2006). 
Generic themes of events, for example, related to a trip or journey, or a family event, are 
rotated across several time periods that cross the life course. 
 Despite these limitations, a significant advantage of the AMI is its brevity in 
administration time, which carries utility within the neuropsychological testing environment. 
It took no longer than forty minutes to complete and in the initial work by Nicolson (2016) 
was administered comfortably within the same session as a multi-domain cognitive screening 
battery. Potential improvements to the AMI when administering to an unimpaired population 
relate to the examination and scoring of episodic events, where greater analysis of contextual 
detail would help to identify truly episodic recall from semantic artefact. Broadening event 
themes would increase its applicability to the experiences of a wider population; and the 
incorporation of an additional life period in adult life would allow for a more nuanced 
examination of autobiographical episodic and semantic recall gradients within a relatively 
understudied PD cohort. However, these elements can be drawn from other well-established 
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autobiographical memory schedules, and have been incorporated into the post-trial 
autobiographical memory testing schedule for the current study.  
1.6 The current study 
The current study examined performance on tasks measuring autobiographical memory and 
ToM in a cohort of well-characterized non-MCI PD patients. They were recruited into a two-
armed randomized controlled trial designed to assess the effects of a lifestyle intervention 
package on cognitive performance. Performance of the PD groups was compared with a 
group of healthy age, sex and education-matched older adult control participants at baseline 
and under blinded testing conditions at end-of-trial. The same sample of PD and HC 
participants used in the initial study by Nicolson (2016) was included in this study, with an 
additional 21 PD participants and 13 HC recruited and entered into the PD Enrichment trial 
over the ensuing ten months. 
 Cognition was assessed using a range of neuropsychological batteries administered at 
baseline and end-of-trial. The false belief cognitive card sequencing task (Langdon et al., 
1997) was used to assess cognitive ToM at baseline and follow-up. The AMI (Kopelman et 
al., 1989) was used as a standard instrument to assess autobiographical episodic and semantic 
memory performance at baseline. End-of-trial autobiographical memory testing incorporated 
the AMI into the EAMI (Irish, Lawlor, O'Mara, & Coen, 2011b), which was introduced 
because of its methodically straightforward yet conceptually robust episodic scoring schedule 
and structural compatibility with the AMI. The thematic scaffolding required for AMI 
longitudinal performance comparisons was incorporated from testing protocols developed by 
Piolino et al. (2002); Piolino et al. (2006). The original EAMI excludes themes in favour of 
unrestricted recall conditions although its prompts are also drawn from Piolino et al. (2002); 
Piolino et al. (2006).  
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 Part of this trial’s intervention package included a series of personal episodic memory 
elaboration sessions. The scientific rationale for this was based on a theory of spreading 
activation of semantic and episodic memory networks (Foster et al., 2017), in which repeated 
activation of an episodic memory may strengthen connections to other associated events, 
thoughts and feelings, which can then be elaborated so as to further strengthen and perpetuate 
the spread of activation to additional associated nodes and networks. In this way, it was 
anticipated that the activation of frequently and less-frequently recollected episodes would be 
increased and strengthened across time. The methodology behind the sessions used 
exploration of episodic details that drew upon descriptive, emotional and metacognitive 
aspects of recall (Irish et al., 2008). A qualitative ‘quilting’ narrative technique assisted with 
accessing less vividly recalled memories (Moore & Davis, 2002). As a supplementary 
activity, participants engaged in hand-drawn mapping exercises of familiar childhood 
environments in order to stimulate DMN regions associated with navigational and spatial 
orientation (Buckner & Carroll, 2007). 
1.7 Study aims  
To reiterate, the current study explored the effect of an eight-month cognitive and physical 
activity lifestyle intervention on performance in measures of cognitive ToM and 
autobiographical memory in a group of non-MCI participants with Parkinson’s disease 
randomized to either an “active enrichment” treatment arm or “passive enrichment” control 
arm. The primary aims of the study were as follows.  
1. To examine whether PD participants in an “active enrichment” intervention arm 
show relative improvement in these measures by comparison with PD participants 
in a “passive enrichment” arm. 
2. To compare performance on these measures with a group of healthy older-adult 
control participants, at baseline and at end-of-trial. 
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 Part of the novelty of this research was to examine an adapted version of the EAMI 
(Irish et al., 2008) for the first time in non-MCI PD patients, who could be further 
characterized as having variable risk for future progression of cognitive decline, based on an 
initial “screening risk score” (Myall et al., 2015). This was also the first time that the Theory 
of Mind card sorting task developed by Langdon et al. (1997) had been used to assess 
cognitive status of PD patients at baseline and at end-of-trial in a randomized controlled trial.
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Chapter 2: Method 
2.1 Participants 
Participants were recruited from a larger population of 238 PD patients involved in a 
longitudinal Health Research Council (HRC) study of progression to PD-MCI, run by the 
New Zealand Brain Research Institute. The process of recruitment, exclusion and retention is 
shown in Figure 2.1. A total of 196 patients received a Level I cognitive screening 
assessment to establish their suitability for the HRC longitudinal study. Of these, 125 
underwent additional Level II neuropsychological testing to confirm non-MCI cognitive 
status. PD participants who satisfied the following inclusion criteria were invited into the 
Enrichment study: a diagnosis of idiopathic PD as defined by the U.K. Parkinson’s disease 
society brain bank clinical diagnostic criteria (Hughes, Ben-Shlomo, Daniel, & Lees, 1992); 
aged 60 - 85 years of age; and fluency in written and spoken English. The exclusion criteria 
included (a) the presence of mild cognitive impairment (PD-MCI) or dementia (PD-D; Wood 
et al., 2016); (b) presence of co-morbid atypical movement disorders; (c) concurrent 
participation in studies involving pharmacological interventions; (d) current use of cognition-
affecting medication; (e) a history of learning disabilities, substance misuse, or major 
medical, psychiatric or neurological illness within the past twelve months. A total of 44 
eligible patient volunteers then completed Enrichment study baseline cognitive assessments. 
They were assessed in the mornings during ‘ON’ state, with symptoms mostly managed with 
anticholinergic, levodopa or other dopamine agonists. These 44 PD participants represented 
the final sample and were randomized into the trial. Their trial entry age is presented in 
Figure 2.2, below. A comparison group of cognitively and physically healthy sex, age (±5y) 
& education-matched (±4y) non-PD control participants (HC; n=28) was also recruited from 
the institute’s volunteer database. 
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Figure 2.1: Process of recruitment and selection of PD and HC participants.  
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Figure 2.2: Study entry age for male and female PD-active, PD-passive and HC participants. 
2.2 Ethics 
Informed consent was given by all participants, and a $20 MTA voucher was provided as 
reimbursement for travel costs for every neuropsychological testing session at the institute. 
The Enrichment study was approved by the New Zealand Health and Disability Ethics 
Committee (HDEC reference number 15/NTB/161). The screening process concerning 
Progression to PD-MCI and PDD was approved by the HDEC (reference number 
URB/09/08/037). 
2.3 Randomization procedure 
Randomized allocation of PD participants into the ‘PD-active’ intervention arm (comprising 
combined cognitive and physical exercises) or ‘PD Passive’ control arm (usual care plus 
monthly researcher contact) was done in four blocks of 8-12 participants following 
completion of baseline assessments (Table 2-1). This process was undertaken using computer 
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generated concealed allocation and stratification of age (60-72y vs 73-85y), duration of PD 
(<8y vs >8y), and high vs low risk of conversion to PD-MCI within a four-year period. Risk 
scores were calculated using an a priori model of risk generated from a large separate NZBRI 
longitudinal study cohort and the neuropsychological screening battery described in the next 
section (Myall et al., 2015). A risk score of 29% was determined as the optimal ROC 
sensitivity and specificity cut-off point for discriminating between patients who would and 
would not convert to PD-MCI across the next four years. To accommodate the sequential 
recruitment of participants into the study, three sets of paired high vs. low risk scores were 
used (29-49% vs >49%; 22-28% vs 15-21%; 0-7% vs 8-14%). Groups were well matched on 
age and education with no significant differences between PD groups. 
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Table 2-1. Breakdown of key enrichment trial time points for each randomized PD group. 
Year 2015 2016 2017
Month 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Level II Neuropsych Assessment
PD-Active
PD-Passive 43 127










Cognitive End of Trial Ass.
PD-Active
PD-Passive 12 8
End-of-Trial ABM + ToM
PD-Active
PD-Passive
Healthy Controls (Cog + ABM + ToM)













Year 2015 2016 2017
Month 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Level II Neuropsych Assessment
PD-Active
PD-Passive 92 105










Cognitive End of Trial Ass.
PD-Active
PD-Passive 25 40
End-of-Trial ABM + ToM
PD-Active
PD-Passive
Healthy Controls (Cog + ABM + ToM)














Table 2-1 contd. 
 
Year 2015 2016 2017
Month 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Level II Neuropsych Assessment
PD-Active
PD-Passive 64 53










Cognitive End of Trial Ass.
PD-Active
PD-Passive 10 7
End-of-Trial ABM + ToM
PD-Active
PD-Passive
Healthy Controls (Cog + ABM + ToM)












Year 2015 2016 2017
Month 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Level II Neuropsych Assessment
PD-Active
PD-Passive 109 61










Cognitive End of Trial Ass.
PD-Active
PD-Passive 6 12
End-of-Trial ABM + ToM
PD-Active
PD-Passive
Healthy Controls (Cog + ABM + ToM)















 Initial cognitive screening assessment 2.4.1
2.4.1.1 Initial cognitive screening test 
The initial cognitive screening assessment formed part of the wider HRC PD Progression 
study. Sessions lasted 30 minutes, and consisted of the Montreal Cognitive Assessment 
(MoCA, Nasreddine et al., 2005) as a measure of global functioning; the Delis-Kaplan Stroop 
word naming, colour naming, and colour-word interference subtest (Delis, Kaplan, Kramer, 
& Ober, 2001); written Trail Making Test (TMT) Version A and Version B, and the Test of 
Everyday Attention (TEA) map search task (Robertson, Ward, Ridgeway, & Nimmo-Smith, 
1994). When adjusted for age, this screening battery has been shown to provide a sensitive 
composite measure of probability of future progression to PD-MCI and was used in the 
generation of risk scores (Myall et al., 2015). All screening assessments were undertaken by a 
project researcher at the NZBRI. 
2.4.1.2 Neuropsychological assessments to establish non-MCI status 
To establish non-MCI cognitive status, PD participants were then given a comprehensive 
neuropsychological testing battery in two separate sessions at the NZBRI. Administration of 
tests adhered to procedures specified in the appropriate testing manuals. The testing battery 
was consistent with the Movement Disorders Society (MDS) Task Force Level II diagnostic 
criteria for PD-MCI by including at least two tests across five cognitive domains (executive 
function, attention and working memory, visuospatial function, memory and learning, 
language; Litvan et al. (2011); Wood et al. (2016)).  
 Executive function was assessed using TMT Part B; D-KEFS letter, category and 
alternating category fluency tasks; Stroop colour-word interference subtest (Delis et al., 
2001); and the action verbal fluency test (Piatt, Fields, Paolo, & Tröster, 2004). Attention and 
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working memory functions were determined using Digit span forward and reverse ordering 
(Wechsler, 2008); the TEA map search task (Robertson et al., 1994); TMT Part A; and 
Stroop word and colour naming subtests (Delis et al., 2001). Visuospatial functioning was 
evaluated using Benton’s Judgement of Line Orientation (Benton, Sivan, Hamsher, & Spreen, 
1994); Visual Object and Space Perception fragmented letters subtest (Warrington, James, & 
Thames Valley Test, 1991); Rey-Osterrieth Complex Figure copy trial (Meyers & Meyers, 
1995); Mini Mental State Examination intersecting pentagon copying test; and the picture 
completion subtest of the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale - Fourth Edition (Wechsler, 
2008). The domain of memory and learning was assessed using California Verbal Learning 
Test - Second Edition (Delis et al., 2001) and Rey-Osterrieth Complex Figure immediate and 
delayed recall trials (Meyers & Meyers, 1995). The fifth domain, Language, was examined 
with the language component of the ADAS-Cog (Mohs et al., 1997); the Dementia Rating 
Scale-2 similarities sub-test (Jurica, Leitten, & Mattis, 2001); and the short-form of the 
Boston Confrontation Naming Test (Kaplan, Goodglass, Weintraub, & Brand, 1983). 
 Enrichment study baseline neuropsychological assessments 2.4.2
HC and PD participants who satisfied Enrichment study inclusion criteria were invited to 
complete a baseline cognitive assessment which took approximately two hours. For PD 
participants, assessment included the 15-item Geriatric Depression Scale (GDS-15; Yesavage 
et al., 1982) and Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale (HADS; Zigmond & Snaith, 1983) 
and the 14-item Starkstein Apathy Scale as a measure of psychiatric status. PD participants 
also received the Brief Visuospatial Memory Test - Revised (BVMT; Benedict, 1997) and the 
written version of the Symbol Digit Modalities Test (Smith, 1982). Semantic language was 
evaluated with the Sydney Language Battery confrontation naming, word comprehension, 
semantic association and single word repetition subtests (Savage et al., 2013). Non-motor 
symptoms were assessed using the REM Sleep Behaviour Disorder Screening Questionnaire, 
37 
Parkinson’s Disease Sleep Scale – Second Edition and the PD Non-Motor Symptoms 
Questionnaire. An in-house Lifetime Activities Questionnaire collected information from all 
participants on type and degree of exposure to physical and non-physical activities across the 
lifetime. HC participants completed a baseline cognitive screening assessment over a single 
two and a half-hour session at the institute, which included the MoCA, Stroop, Trails A & B, 
TEA Map Search, SDMT, and HADS. PD and HC participants were also tested for theory of 
mind and autobiographical memory performance, described in the following sections. 
2.4.2.1 Autobiographical memory interview  
The Autobiographical Memory Interview (AMI; Kopelman et al., 1989) was used as a 
measure of baseline episodic and semantic ABM performance. This semi-structured 
questionnaire is divided into semantic and episodic schedules which measure recall of 
personal facts and specific event incidents across three life periods: Childhood, from infancy 
to adolescence (ages 0-18); Young Adulthood (ages 18-early thirties); and Recent Life status 
(within the past 5 years). The organization of the AMI semantic memory schedule into life 
periods and its subsections is presented in Table 2-2. For each subsection, semantic enquiry 
was followed by one episodic memory event enquiry (excepting Last Christmas; nine events 
in total).  
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Childhood 21 pts Before school 5 pts Address, names of three friends 
  First/Primary school 8 pts 
Name and location of school, age at starting, 
address, names of three teachers or friends 
  Main secondary school 8 pts 
Name and location of school, number and level 
of exams passed, address, names of three 
teachers or friends 
Early Adult Life 21 pts Career 8 pts 
Name of firm or college, qualifications obtained 
or first job, address, names of three friends or 
colleagues 
  Wedding: own or another’s 9 pts 
Whose, where, when, address before and after 
wedding, names of best man, bridesmaid, bride’s 
maiden name 
  Children 4 pts 
Names of two children, dates and locations of 
birth 
Recent Life 21 pts Present hospital 8 pts 
Name and location of present hospital, date of 
last attendance, names of three staff or patients, 
current address 
  Previous hospital 8 pts 
Name and date of previous hospital admission, 
address at that time 
  Last Christmas 2 pts 
Where last Christmas was spent and who with, 
names of three visitors or relatives seen in last 
year 
  
Holidays or other journeys in 
last year 
(or within last five years) 
 
3 pts Destination, date, name of one travel companion 
 
The AMI episodic memory schedule requires participants to provide memories for nine 
incidents (‘events’) that occurred across the three life periods, each related to particular 
themes (Table 2-4, pp.49). At the commencement of the episodic schedule, participants were 
read the following script, adapted from Piolino et al. (2002): 
 ‘’For each event, describe it out loud and with as much detail as possible, what 
happened, as if you are able to relive it: what you did and what you felt, the circumstances, 
when, with whom, where and how it happened. For example, if you are recalling holidays at 
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the seaside, you must avoid general descriptions. Rather, give precise memories of a 
particular event which happened on a day during these holidays.’ 
 Participants were reminded regularly thereafter that their recollections should be 
described with as much detail as possible. For each episodic event enquiry, participants were 
firstly given a period of time to engage in free recall. If an incident was not forthcoming, they 
were prompted with cues provided in the AMI schedule (Kopelman et al., 1989, p. 55; Table 
6). Episodic incidents were scored on a 0-3 scale with one point awarded for the provision of 
each of three elements: an isolated, one off-event lasting less than a day; where it took place 
geographically; and when it occurred (specific age or year or time of day). All interviews 
were recorded using the AMI scoring booklet with audio recorded on a Zoom H4N recorder.  
2.4.2.2 Theory of mind card sorting task 
Theory of mind performance was assessed with a cognitive theory of mind card sorting task 
(Langdon et al., 1997). This task presents a series of mixed-up stories on black and white 
cartoon illustration cards (21cm x 15cm) which participants must re-arrange to form logical 
sequences of events. There are four conditions divided evenly across 16 stories, with the 
scenes of each story depicted across four cards. A False Belief condition is compared with 
three control conditions that screen for sequencing errors caused by factors other than 
potential ToM deficits. The False Belief stories require the participant to understand the 
behaviour of a character whose actions in the story depend on their naivety to a salient event 
that has just taken place. The Mechanical condition requires the ordering of objects 
interacting causally. For the Social Script condition, characters are involved in a daily 
activity; and in the Complex Reasoning condition, characters are depicted in routine activities 
where there is an obvious misleading clue plus another more subtle clue which the participant 
must identify in order to correctly sequence the story.  
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 As presented in Appendix A, each participant received the same scripted instructions 
Participants were then sequentially presented with each story. Cards were placed face down 
in a row of four in a fixed semi-randomised order, as shown on the scoring sheet presented in 
Appendix B. Participants were asked to turn the cards over, rearrange them and signal when 
they were finished. The time taken for each story to be reordered to the participant’s 
satisfaction was recorded using a stop clock. The sequencing of cards for preparation and 
scoring was aided by coloured dots and numbers that were printed discreetly on their reverse 
side and which were interpretable only to the assessor. Each condition was scored from a 
maximum of 24 points.  
 Enrichment trial activities  2.4.3
Following baseline testing, participants entered the Enrichment trial in four groups staggered 
over the course of twelve months (Table 2-1) between March and October 2016. Over an 
eight-month period, PD-active participants received weekly physical exercise sessions and 
cognitive exercises in fortnightly manuals. PD-passive participants received scientific news 
articles and related questions on a monthly basis. For the duration of the trial, all PD 
participants completed weekly thinking, memory and physical activity diaries, monthly 
questionnaires and a dietary nutrition questionnaire. For HC participants, no contact was 
made in the interceding months between baseline and end-of-trial testing. 
2.4.3.1 Physical exercise training 
On a weekly basis in groups of three or four, PD-active participants attended a Christchurch 
Physiotherapy Centre gym for one-hour exercise classes supervised by Otago university 
physiotherapists (Mulligan et al., 2018). The classes encouraged social engagement and 
involved warm-ups with strength, balance, resisted and aerobic circuit exercises. Participants 
were encouraged to exercise to a level of exertion that would improve fitness over time whilst 
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maintaining heart rate within safe parameters. This was represented visually as a gym wall 
poster of exertion emoticons (Figure 2.3).  
2.4.3.2 Cognitive exercise folders 
As part of the intervention, PD-active arm participants were given cognitive exercise folder 
manuals on a fortnightly basis over the eight-month trial period, which contained 
approximately one and a half hours of exercises per manual (three hours per fortnight). 
Manuals included different novel exercise tasks designed by the research team, which were to 
be completed with the supervision of a support person. Tasks were designed to become 
increasingly more challenging with successful progression so that sense of achievement was 
maintained. To ensure they were not too difficult, they were rated on their level of challenge 
by participants (i.e., ‘too easy’; ‘easy’; ‘ok’; ‘hard’; ‘too hard’), and were adjusted on a case-
by-case as required. Overall, twenty different tasks were integrated into eighteen manuals to 
form a comprehensive, multi-domain cognitive exercise intervention package. Sixteen tasks 
stimulated externally-directed modes of thought and engaged the attention, executive 
function, memory, visuospatial and language networks. Four exercises activated internal 
modes of thought and stimulated the DMN. These included Reading the Mind in the Eyes 
and Faux Pas story tasks, as well as moral dilemma reasoning and envisioning future events 
(Appendix C). The salience switch network was stimulated by switching between exercises 
that engaged internal and external modes of cognition respectively. Disseminated task 
accessories included cards, counting timers, coloured shapes and letter-grid shakers. 
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Figure 2.3: Exertion emoticons for participants at exercise session (target: 13). 
2.4.3.3 Episodic memory elaboration sessions 
As part of the cognitive exercise programme, PD-active participants were invited to take part 
in a series of six memory elaboration sessions which were conducted by the author at 
participants’ homes or in a quiet room at the institute. These sessions took place every three 
to four weeks over the second four months of the Enrichment trial. Their aim was to 
encourage activation of key DMN regions by rehearsing and elaborating three episodic 
events given by participants at the baseline autobiographical memory assessment, derived 
from each of the three life periods examined in the AMI: 
i. An incident from high school. 
ii. An incident at a wedding during the participant’s twenties. 
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iii. A recent trip or journey from within the last six years. 
If a memory had not been provided at baseline testing, an alternative event was identified in 
the earliest session to enable the elaboration exercises. Critically, three new incidents were 
also identified during the earliest elaboration sessions, which were needed to replace the 
elaborated baseline events, for later end-of-trial testing. These incidents were selected based 
on their similarity to the original baseline events in their level of detail. They were discretely 
noted down but not rehearsed with the participant at any stage. 
 Participants also selected a photo depicting a memorable personal event from the 
previous ten years, which was elaborated over two visits. To exercise spatial domains, an 
additional activity included sketching layouts of childhood homes, schools or 
neighbourhoods over two visits, with the second session used to add fresh layers of detail or 
elaborate associated episodic recollections (Appendix D). A variation of this exercise 
involved reviewing printed Google maps of areas participants lived or regularly frequented, 
to encourage reflections about environmental and socio-cultural landscapes plus activities of 
the time. Appendix E presents extracts of transcribed baseline events, Appendix F, 
transcribed excerpts of dialogue from elaboration sessions. Participants were also encouraged 
to think about various other aspects of their lives at the time of these events, including 
accommodation lodgings, pastimes, environments, activities and so forth. Two events were 
elaborated per visit with the three baseline events revisited four times in rotation across the 
six sessions (Table 2-3). 
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Table 2-3. Schedule of elaboration sessions for PD-active participants. 
    Session 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 
Event (1) High School   -   - 
 (2) Wedding  -   -  
 (3) Recent Journey -   -   
 (Photo within the last ten years) - -   - - 
Note. Sessions were scheduled every three-to-four weeks, four months into the trial for each PD-active 
participant.  
 
 The overarching aim of the memory elaboration sessions was to stimulate the DMN 
by encouraging the frequency of reminiscences during and between visits and elaboration of 
recalled details over time. Participants were encouraged to pay attention to the 
phenomenological aspects of episodic recall; especially visual imagery, emotional contexts, 
temporal, spatial and sensory details, as well as reflect upon the thoughts and emotions of 
other agents represented in their recollections. Participants were also encouraged to close 
their eyes in order to reduce distractions from external stimuli, and augment retrieval of 
visual imagery (Nori, Bensi, Gambetti, & Giusberti, 2014; Vredeveldt, Hitch, & Baddeley, 
2011).  
 Sessions were loosely structured to accommodate spontaneous recollections and were 
conducted in a conversational manner using open-ended, non-leading questions to minimize 
suggestive questioning (Nori et al., 2014; Wright & Holliday, 2007). Based on a collaborative 
‘quilting’ technique (Moore & Davis, 2002), any words or details that were repeated or 
followed by hesitancies or utterances were encouraged for further elaboration or noted down, 
so that the related subject material could be revisited in forthcoming sessions. These 
conversational inflections may have signalled the resurfacing or activation of personally 
salient events to be explored further. Any unpleasant memories were avoided. To prepare for 
each elaboration session, a list of open-ended questions was generated for each event which 
drew upon the progress and departure points of the previous session. This preparatory process 
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was aided by recording each session (with participant consent), and note taking. Equipment 
included an H4N microphone recorder, notebook, pens, pencils, paper. 
 In total, 18 of the 21 PD-active participants completed the full six sessions; one 
participant completed five sessions and one completed four. Across all participants, 
approximately 1360-1365 minutes (23 hours) was spent elaborating a high school event from 
Childhood; 1395-1400 minutes (23.3 hours) elaborating a wedding event from Young 
Adulthood; and 1361 – 1365 minutes (22.6 hours) elaborating a recent journey. Events 
depicted in photos were elaborated for between 465-470 minutes (7.8 hours). Audio for eight 
sessions was lost and is not included in these time summaries.  
2.4.3.4 Weekly diaries and monthly questionnaires  
In the interests of maintaining researcher contact, monitoring symptoms throughout the trial 
and ensuring a well-characterized PD cohort, a series of weekly and monthly self-
administered questionnaires were completed by both groups throughout the trial. Weekly 
diary sheets were used to record the types of thinking, memory, social, and physical activities 
participants had engaged in each day, as well as the amount of time they had spent on each 
activity. Four additional questionnaires were completed on a monthly basis to monitor PD 
symptoms. These included the PDSS-2, PD-REM sleep behaviour questionnaire, PD-NMS 
scale, and the Parkinson’s Well Being Map (UCB, 2013), which screens PD motor and non-
motor symptoms across seven psycho-social domains of wellbeing. A nutritional 
questionnaire was completed every three months to capture details relating to participant 
weight, diet, dining habits and their consumption of vitamin and mineral supplements 
(‘Screen’, Keller, Haresign, & Brockest, 2007). Updates to medications were also checked on 
a monthly basis. 
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2.4.3.5 Scientific magazine articles 
To encourage regular contact with the research team, Active-control participants received 
monthly paragraph-sized summaries of interesting science articles recently published in 
reputable magazines (e.g., New Scientist), which were accompanied by three questions 
relating to the content of the articles. These were completed by participants and emailed or 
posted back to the research team. 
 Enrichment study end-of-trial neuropsychological assessments 2.4.4
After completion of the active phase of the Enrichment study, PD participants returned to the 
institute for two 120-minute end-of-trial cognitive assessments, which involved repeating 
most of the pre-trial Level II and Enrichment baseline tests, including the Theory of Mind 
card sorting task and a revised ABM testing schedule. The revised ABM schedule comprised 
an amalgamation of the AMI with the semantic and episodic subscales of the EAMI which is 
described in the following section. All end-of trial PD testing was conducted under blinded 
conditions.  
 In the first assessment session, general cognitive functioning was reassessed with the 
Montreal Cognitive Assessment. Executive function was assessed using TMT Part B; Stroop 
colour-word interference subtest and the action verbal fluency test, Attention and working 
memory functions were investigated with the TEA map search task; TMT Version A; Stroop 
word and colour naming subtests the Symbol Digits Modality Test. Visuospatial memory and 
functioning was evaluated using Benton’s Judgement of Line Orientation; Rey-Osterrieth 
Complex Figure copy trial; the BVMT and the Mini Mental State Examination (Tombaugh & 
McIntyre, 1992) intersecting pentagon copying test. The domain of memory and learning was 
assessed using California Verbal Learning Test - Second Edition, and Rey-Osterrieth 
Complex Figure immediate and delayed recall trials. The Language domain was examined 
with the language component of the ADAS-Cog; the verbal fluency task; the Dementia 
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Rating Scale-2 similarities sub-test; the visual association test; and the short-form of the 
Boston Confrontation Naming Test. Psychiatric wellbeing was re-assessed using the 15-item 
Geriatric Depression Scale (GDS-15), Starkstein Apathy Scale, the Hospital Anxiety and 
Depression Scale (HADS) and the Parkinson’s Disease Questionnaire (Jenkinson, Peto, 
Fitzpatrick, Greenhall, & Hyman, 1995). In the second cognitive testing session, the Theory 
of Mind card sorting task and the revised ABM testing schedule (comprising the AMI and 
EAMI), was administered. HC participants completed a single end-of-trial assessment over a 
two and a half-hour session at the institute. They were administered the ToM card sorting 
task and revised ABM testing schedule, and the cognitive screening battery (the MoCA, 
Stroop, Trails Version A & Version B, and TEA Map Search) as well as the SDMT, BVMT 
and HADS. HC participants were assessed at baseline and end-of-trial assessment by 
Nicolson (2016) and the author. Baseline ToM and AMI testing for PD participants was 
conducted by Nicolson (2016) and the author. 
2.4.4.1 Autobiographical memory retesting 
Personal semantic and episodic memory retesting was undertaken using a combined 
interview protocol which represented an amalgamation of the Autobiographical Memory 
Interview (AMI; Kopelman et al., 1989); and personal semantic and episodic subscales of the 
Episodic Autobiographical Memory Interview (EAMI; Irish et al., 2008, Appendix G; H). 
This was possible because of design similarities in terms of overlap of life periods examined 
and the dual-schedule distinction between episodic and semantic declarative memory 
components. A small modification to the EAMI episodic subscale checklist involved the 
addition of four episodic event themes to guide participant memory selection. This was done 
to facilitate comparisons between baseline and end-of-trial performance, because the AMI 
restricts recall to specific topics whereas the EAMI does not use topic parameters at all, 
instead offering prompts when required. Therefore, four event topics compatible with both 
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the baseline enquiries of  the AMI were drawn from Piolino et al. (2002) and added to the 
retesting schedule (Table 2-4). As a precautionary measure to preserve blinded testing 
conditions, the Recent Life period was adjusted to span the previous six years and exclude 
the twelve months preceding test date for five question items (S.4.4.1.- S.4.4.5). This placed 
activities related to the Enrichment trial outside the time range under investigation, thus 
reducing the risk of divulgence of arm allocation. Akin to the EAMI approach, a fourth, Later 
Adulthood period was also added which was not included in AMI baseline assessment. In 
total, four life periods were examined for semantic and episodic memory recall performance 
at end-of-trial assessment: Childhood (age 0-18), Early Adulthood (age 18-30), Later 
Adulthood (age 45 – 6 years ago), and Recent Life (between six years and 12 months ago). 
Three episodic events were assessed within each life period. The Childhood life period was 
separated into three age bands: Before School (age 0-five), Primary School (age five-11), 
High School (age 11-18) with one episodic memory event allocated to each age band. 
Because of considerations to time and interview length, a Middle Adulthood life period (age 
30-45) was not included in end-of-trial assessment. 
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Table 2-4. Baseline and end-of-trial episodic memory testing schedules with event item topics and 
prompts. 
Baseline (AMI) End-of-Trial (AMI + EAMI) 
Childhood 





Before starting school (age 0 - 5) 
First memory? Involving a brother or sister? 
 
Before starting school (age 0 – 5) 
First memory? Involving your family, a brother or 




During primary school (age 5 - 11) 
Involving a teacher? Involving a friend? 
 
During primary school (age 5-11) 
Involving a teacher? Involving a friend?  




During high school (age 11 - 18) 
Involving a teacher? Involving a friend? 
During high school (age 11-18) 
Involving a teacher? Involving a friend? Your 
confirmation? 
Early Adulthood 




From this (sic) wedding 
An incident involving a guest? 
An incident at the reception? 
 
Related to a wedding or another type of family 
occasion 
A family holiday?  
The day of a birth? 
Event 
2.2. 
A first encounter with someone while in your 
twenties 
Meeting someone in an interview? 
Meeting someone on holiday or at work? 
Related to a specific person 
A first encounter with someone? A first meeting 




From college or the first job 
Your first day at work or college? 
An incident with a friend? 
Related to college or professional life 
Your first day at work or college? An incident with 
a friend? A day with a teacher? 
Later Adulthood 




 Related to a trip or journey 
At the place you visited? Involving someone you 




 Related to a family event or occasion 
A birthday? Christmas day? A death? 
Event 
3.3. 
 Related to professional life or retirement 
Something unusual that happened at work? A day 
with your grandchildren? A day you went 
somewhere special? 
Recent Life 
(within last five years) 
Recent Life 





Whilst at hospital or at institution 
Involving the other patients? 
To do with the doctors or nurses? 
 
 
Related to a specific person 
An incident which occurred at hospital? Involving a 




Involving a relative or visitor in the last year 
A visit by or to a relative? 
Involving some news about a relative? 
Related to a family event or occasion 
An incident involving a relative? Involving a visit 






Related to a holiday or journey 
At the (sic) place you visited? 
Involving someone you met? 
Related to a trip or journey 
At a place you visited? Involving someone you 
met? 
While you were travelling? 
 
Abbreviations: AMI=Autobiographical Memory Interview; EAMI=Episodic Autobiographical Memory 
Interview. 
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 The EAMI builds upon the AMI’s three-point episodic memory scoring scale with the 
Episodic Subscale Checklist, which investigates the contents of any given memory using a 
score range of seven points. This score total reflects seven discrete categories of contextually 
specific detail, which are regarded as indicators of the episodic experience of ‘reliving’ of an 
event from memory (Irish et al., 2008; 2010; Table 2-5, reproduced courtesy of Irish, 
personal communication, September 12, 2016).  
 Semantic memory was assessed with a schedule that included all AMI and EAMI 
semantic schedule questions (Appendix G; Appendix K). The EAMI semantic assessment 
followed the following format (Irish et al., 2008): participants were asked to provide 
information relating to three distinct categories of information for each life period: (i) Names 
of people, (ii) Daily Living, and (iii) Important Dates. Each life period was scored from 14 
points with exception of the Childhood period (Age 0-5 years; 5-11 years; 11-18 years), for 
which point subtotals of 10, 10, and 14 points were allocated to each of the three age bands 
respectively. For Names of People, the provision of three full names and the participant’s 
relationship to each was scored one point for each full name and one point for each 
relationship (maximum of six points; half points were awarded for providing only christian or 
surnames). For Daily Living, participants scored one point for naming an 
institution/association they were involved with at that time, one point for its location, one 
point for specifying the type of work/study/hobby that was involved, and one point for the 
means of travel there (maximum of four points). Providing a specific date for an important 
event was awarded one point for the date, one point for month, one point for year, and one 
point for location of event (maximum of four points). No points were awarded for repetitions 
across life periods.  
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Table 2-5. End-of-trial EAMI scoring schedule for episodic events. A maximum of 1 point is awarded 
for each category, based on degree of detail provided. 
Score Information 
 1. Event Detail  
1 Producing a framework for a clear, discernible once-off event lasting less than 24 hours  
0.5 Vague, once-off event lasting less than 24 hours 
0.5 Detailed event lasting longer than 24 hours 
0.5 Event that has been repeated (and is likely to be semanticised) 
0.5 Skeletal description of an event that requires continual probing for more information 
0 No event recalled 
 
 
2. Temporal Specificity  
1 Year, month, date, specific time of day (provision of 4 temporal elements) 
0.5 Provision with specificity of any 2 elements (e.g. year/age, month), guessing or hesitation of other 2 
elements 
0 Indications of guessing, hesitancy, speculation on 3 elements 
 
 
3. Sensory / Perceptual Detail* 
1 Clear sensory details relating to the main event; can be visualized by the scorer 
0.5 Vague descriptions with absence of details / regularly encountered scenes (semanticised) 
0 Indications of no mental imagery (e.g. fact-like descriptions divested of mental imagery; emotional rather 
than visual recall) 
 
 
4. Spatial Detail 
1 Recall of general location (allocentric), plus specific location within the spatial array (egocentric)  
0.5 Recall of either allocentric or egocentric information but not both 
0 No recall or speculative answers 
 
 
5. Emotion Detail 
1 Clear recall of actual emotions experienced, not over a period of time or speculating about what is ‘normally 
felt’ 
0  Unable to recall the emotion felt, speculative answers 
 
 
6. Thoughts (Meta-cognition) 
1 Able to clearly recollect thoughts at the time of the event (separate from feelings) 




1 Recall of specific activities 36 hours before and 36 hours after the main event, without speculation 
0.5 Recall of events either before or after the main event but not both, or speculative answers for either 
0 No recall of events preceding or subsequent to the main event, or speculative / semanticised answers for both  
Note. Each phenomenological category is scored from 1 point, with a maximum of 7 points awarded for each 
episodic memory. *What is ‘seen’ in the mind’s eye during EM recall. This is typically visual imagery, but may also 
involve other sense modalities. Acknowledgement: M. Irish (personal communication, September 12, 2016). 
 Episodic memory testing for each life period comprised three event enquiries 
following the semantic section except for Childhood, in which one event enquiry followed 
each Before School, Primary School and High School semantic section. The twelve event 
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enquiries involved asking participants to describe a personal event with as much detail as 
possible, relating to one of the following four themes which were rotated across Early Adult 
Life, Later Adult Life, and Recent Life epochs:  
i. a meeting or event linked to a person 
ii. a trip or journey 
iii. college/professional life or professional life/retirement 
iv. a family event or occasion. 
These themes bridged the thematic specificity of the AMI and the free recall conditions of the 
EAMI, allowing AMI-based comparisons to still be drawn between baseline and end-of-trial 
recall performances. Participants were initially invited to engage in free recall of an event and 
to describe it with as much detail as possible, which replicated AMI baseline testing 
conditions. They were offered the prompts (Table 2-4) if they struggled to recall any memory 
at all. Following this free recall phase, the interviewer then probed for presence of contextual 
details by moving through the EAMI Episodic Subscale Event Details Checklist (adapted 
from Irish et al. (2011a); Appendix H). Participants were kept reminded of the life period 
under investigation with cards placed on the table in from of them (‘Before you went to 
school (up to five years old)’; ‘Primary school (aged between five and 11)’; ‘High school 
(aged between 11 and 18)’; ‘Between 18 and 30’; ‘Aged 45 until six years ago’; ‘Between six 
years and twelve months ago’). 
2.4.4.2 Avoidance of baseline episodic events 
At the beginning of each ABM interview, the assessor read an introductory statement that 
notified participants that they may sometimes begin to describe a memory and then be asked 
to think of a different memory. This was because, as outlined previously, during the active 
phase of the Enrichment trial PD-active participants received an intervention that involved 
elaborating and rehearsing three episodic memories taken from their baseline AMI 
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autobiographical memory interview. Therefore, to avoid possible scoring advantages gained 
by the inclusion of rehearsed events, all participants (PD-active, PD-passive and HC) were 
asked to provide a different memory if they gave any baseline event spontaneously on the 
first pass. 
 For each interview, the assessor was provided with the list of memories a participant 
had given at AMI baseline testing, which were to be avoided. These ‘Avoid Events’ were 
described in truncated paraphrases that captured the central event (Appendix I). The purpose 
for paraphrasing the baseline events in this way, was to provide the blinded interviewer 
enough detail to recognise a baseline event, but also keep the format as simplified as possible 
so that they would be unlikely to identify study arm allocation through the differing 
presentations between the groups, of the three baseline event items used in elaboration 
exercises by the PD-active group only (high school event, wedding event, a recent journey). 
 As outlined previously, during elaboration exercises with the PD Active Enrichment 
group, three ‘substitute’ baseline memories were discreetly identified at the earliest occasion, 
which were destined to replace the elaborated ones at end-of-trial testing. For the PD-active 
group, the substitute memories were presented beneath the original baseline events in the 
‘Avoid Events’ sheet. For PD-passive group, re-phrased descriptions of the same baseline 
events were presented underneath in the same manner. To help keep the situation unclear and 
maintain blinded conditions, the interviewer was not informed of the Enrichment study’s 
memory elaboration exercises or explained the origins of any substitute events, until all end-
of-trial testing was completed. 
 All participants were permitted to resume recall of baseline events if they 
spontaneously provided these in the first instance and were unable to produce an alternative 
event when asked to do so. The difference for the PD-active group was that if an elaborated 
High School, Wedding or Recent Journey baseline event was produced and an alternative 
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event was not forthcoming, the interviewer cued the participant with the substitute event via 
graduated disclosure of its three paraphrased descriptor statements. Guidelines for avoidance 
of events are summarised as follows: 
1. If a participant starts to describe any memory listed on the baseline events avoid 
sheet, they must be asked to think of a different memory because baseline memories 
are to be avoided wherever possible. 
2. The only times participants can use a baseline memory is if they cannot produce an 
alternative memory. 
2a. Substitute baseline memory events are located underneath Avoid events 1.3, 
 2.1, 4.2. They can be used if participants bring them up spontaneously; or if 
 participants start to describe an Avoid event but cannot provide a different 
 memory when asked to. 
 ABM retesting lasted approximately two hours, and all interviews were recorded with 
consent using an H4N microphone. Baseline measures of ABM using the AMI (Kopelman et 
al., 1989) were scored after completion of Baseline testing by Nicolson (2016) and the 
author. At the completion of end-of-trial ABM testing for all participant groups, data was 
scored using AMI and EAMI testing procedures, by the author. The scoring sheets for 
semantic and episodic end-of-trial testing are presented in Appendix K. 
 All end-of-trial episodic events from PD participant groups were transcribed using 
Dragon Naturally Speaking desktop software and scored following the EAMI scoring 
protocol. An initial 60 memories from five randomly-selected participants were also scored 
by a blinded senior researcher from the EAMI development and publication group (Irish, 
personal communication, October 23, 2017). Regular scoring comparison reviews were held 
over telephone and email. An intra-class correlation coefficient of 0.897 was achieved with a 
95% confidence interval from .828 to .939, F (1, 59) = 9.730, p =.000. This was calculated on 
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IBM SPSS statistics 25 using a two-way mixed model with absolute agreement. Due to time 
constraints, episodic events for the HC group were not transcribed. Instead they were scored 
using audio playback. Twelve PD events were scored off audio and then off transcribed 
interview for practice comparisons to check maintenance of scoring consistency. Scoring of 
HC events then took place after completion of scoring of the PD groups, by which time 
scoring proficiency was accurate and efficient. To check consistency, for every 48 HC 
events, one randomly selected PD event was scored again using audio, and compared on 
scores awarded using transcribed material. 
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Chapter 3: Results 
3.1 Demographic and clinical features of the participants 
Table 3-1 summarizes the demographic, clinical characteristics, and global scores of the PD-
active, PD-passive, and HC participants at the screening assessment prior to trial 
commencement. Detailed information on neuropsychological testing will be included in a 
forthcoming PhD thesis (Megan Livingstone). The PD group achieved marginally but 
significantly worse MoCA scores than the HC group, and higher HADS depression and 
anxiety measures (Table 3-1). The two PD groups had equal risk scores for progression to 
PD-MCI. The component z-score measures were used to generate the risk score were 
significantly worse in the PD group than the HC group for TEA Map Search (1 min: PD-
active: 0.02±1.11; PD-passive: -0.16±0.77; HC: 1.00±0.79), Stroop Interference (PD-active: 
0.24±0.94; PD Passive: 0.09±0.93; HC: 0.82±0.69), and Trails B (PD-active: 0.45±0.91; PD-
passive: 0.22±1.19; HC: 0.84±0.86). The two PD groups did not differ on any cognitive or 
neuropsychiatric measures. Moreover, none of the PD patients met the NZBRI level II PD-
MCI criteria (data produced courtesy of M. Livingstone, J. Goh, M. Goulden, D. Myall, T. 
Anderson, L. Hale, H. Mulligan, J. Dalrymple-Alford; New Zealand Brain Research Institute; 
University of Canterbury; Otago University). Four HC participants were lost to attrition at 
end-of-trial ABM assessment (two females, two males); and three at end-of-trial ToM 
assessment (two females, one male). 
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Table 3-1. Clinical, cognitive and psychiatric measures of PD and HC participants at baseline 
(M±SD). 
  Group Difference of means 
 PD-active PD-passive HC HC : PD PD-A : PD-P 
Demographic Characteristics      
Sex; M:F 13:8 13:6 15:13 - - 
Age 69.4±6.8 69.5±5.3 73.2±6.5 - - 
Education 13.0 12.9 13.4 - - 
Clinical Measures      
PD Symptom duration (yrs)  
at screening 
7.90±5.81 7.57±4.66 - - -.34 
PD Hoehn & Yahr 2.24 2.08 - - -.16 
HADS Anxiety 4.57±3.41 4.42±2.61 2.89±3.15 -1.62* -.18 
HADS Depression 3.62±2.40 3.79±3.07 1.93±2.31 -1.69* .34 
MoCA (raw score) 26.10±2.07 25.47±2.14 27.61±1.6 1.81** -.62 
Risk Score for future MCI 0.34±0.22 0.39±0.23 - - - 
Note. Difference is significant at * p < .05; ** p <.001, based on independent samples t tests 
comparing groups at baseline. Risk Score for future MCI = the probability of advancing to PD-MCI 
status over the next four years based on age, MoCA, TEA Map Search, Stroop, and Trails B. 
Abbreviations: HADS = Hospital Anxiety Depression Scale; MCI = Mild Cognitive Impairment; 
MoCA = Montreal Cognitive Assessment; PD = Parkinson’s disease; PD-A = PD-active group; PD-P 
= PD-passive group. 
3.2 Theory of mind  
This analysis was generated using ANOVA applied to a multi-level linear model. The main 
analysis used Group (HC; PD-active; PD-passive) as three levels of the between-group factor, 
and Trial (baseline vs end-of-trial) as the repeated measures factor. An additional covariate 
analysis included education, age at study entry and sex.  
 To re-cap, the ToM card sorting task used 16 short story sequences to compare group 
performance on a “false belief” condition and three non-ToM control conditions. The latter 
conditions examined sequencing errors caused by factors other than false belief ToM. 
 The mean scores for the four conditions for each of the three participant groups, 
across baseline and end-of trial are shown in (Figure 3.1). The “mechanical” and “social 




Figure 3.1. Mean baseline and end of trial ToM scores for HC, PD-active and PD-passive participant 
groups across conditions(Langdon et al., 1997). Abbreviations: HC = Healthy controls; PD = 
Parkinson’s disease. 
 Performance in the ToM false belief condition did not differ across the three groups, 
Group main effect, F (2, 65) = 1.08, p > 0.1. There was also no difference in performance 
between baseline and end-of-trial, Trial main effect, F (1, 62) = 1.55, p > 0.1; Figure 3.1. 
There was however a Group x Trial interaction effect, F (2, 62) = 6.15, p < .01, with the PD-
active group showing poorer scores at baseline and an increase by end-of-trial. This was 
confirmed using a Tukey post-hoc test in that group, p < 0.02. Inclusion of Education, Sex 
and Age covariates did not change this significant interaction effect, Group x Trial, F (2, 61) 
= 6.55, p < 0.01; Age, Sex, Education, all p > 0.1.  
  For the three other (control) conditions, all groups performed similarly overall and 
across baseline and end-of-trial, with no interaction effects observed. Social Script: Group, F 
(2, 65) < 1.0, p > 0.1, Trial F (1, 62) < 1.0, p > 0.1, Group x Trial F (2, 62) = 1.23, p > 0.1; 
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Mechanical: Group F (2, 65) < 1.0, p > 0.1, Trial F (1, 62) < 1.0, p > 0.1, Group x Trial F (2, 
62) < 1.0, p > 0.1; Capture: Group F (2, 65) < 1.0, p > 0.1, Trial F (1, 62) < 1.0, p > 0.1, 
Group x Trial F (2, 62) < 1.0, p > 0.1.  
3.3 Autobiographical memory  
A multi-level linear model was again used here. In this instance, the ANOVA for AMI data 
used Group (HC; PD-active; PD-passive) as three levels of the between-group factor, and 
Epoch (e.g. three life periods for the AMI) and Trial (baseline versus end-of-trial) as the 
repeated measures factors. An additional covariate analysis included education, age at study 
entry and sex. Follow-up analyses examined (a) HC group versus All PDs and (b) just the 
two PD groups. This analytic procedure was conducted for episodic memory scores and for 
semantic memory scores for the AMI. As the EAMI was conducted only at end-of-trial, the 
same procedures were used but the Trial factor was not relevant. For the EAMI, there were 
four life periods (4 levels for Epoch). 
 Semantic memory 3.3.1
3.3.1.1 AMI semantic memory: pre vs. post-trial 
To recap, the AMI semantic memory schedule examined performance of semantic recall over 
three life periods, Childhood (ages 0-18), Early Adulthood (ages 18-30) and Recent Life. The 
baseline AMI Recent Life period examined the five years preceding test date. At end-of-trial, 
and to avoid memories relating to the Enrichment Study, the timeframe for AMI Recent Life 
period encompassed the previous six years, and excluding the twelve months preceding the 
test date for five questions. Each time period was scored from a total of 21 points, which was 
converted to a percentage of maximum possible score for each participant. The percent mean 
semantic memory scores for the AMI in the three groups across Epoch, both at baseline and 
end-of-trial, are presented in Figure 3.2. Superior semantic recall was evident in the HC 
60 
group, Group main effect, F (2, 61) = 6.56, p < 0.01; irrespective of Trial, Group x Trial, F 
(2, 61) < 1.0, p > 0.1); or life period, Group x Epoch, F (4, 244) = 1.58, p > 0.1; Group x 
Epoch x Trial, F (4, 244) = 1.36, p > 0.1.  
 
Figure 3.2. Baseline and end-of-trial AMI semantic memory scores for the HC, PD-passive and PD-
active groups across life periods. Abbreviations: HC = Healthy controls; PD = Parkinson’s disease; 
T1 = Trial 1 (baseline), T2 = Trial 2 (end-of-trial). 
 Post-hoc contrasts (Tukey) confirmed higher semantic memory scores of the HC 
group compared to the PD-passive group, p <.01. The PD-active group had intermediate 
semantic recall and did not differ from either the HC group or the PD-passive group (p > 0.5). 
The main effect of Group remained after controlling for demographic covariates, Group F (2, 
58) = 6.31, p < 0.01; Age, Sex, Education, all p > 0.1. Semantic scores showed a recency 
effect with highest scores for Recent Life and lowest scores for Childhood, Epoch main 
effect, F (2, 244) = 20.42, p < 0.001. However, semantic memory scores were lower at end-
61 
of-trial than at baseline, Trial main effect, F (1, 61) = 22.45, p < 0.001. The only other effect 
was an Epoch x Trial interaction effect, F (2, 244 = 5.98 p < 0.01; Figure 3.3. Baseline and 
end-of-trial AMI semantic scores for each life period examined, collapsed across groups). 
That is, regardless of group, end-of-trial AMI semantic recall remained relatively stable for 
Childhood and Early Adulthood life periods compared to baseline, but was more clearly 
poorer at end-of-trial for the Recent Life period. There was no Group x Trial interaction, F 
(2, 61) < 1.0, p > 0.1, or Group x Epoch x Trial interaction, F (4, 244) = 1.36, p > 0.1. 
 
 
Figure 3.3. Baseline and end-of-trial AMI semantic scores for each life period examined, collapsed 
across groups. Abbreviations: T1 = Trial 1 (baseline), T2 = Trial 2 (end-of-trial). 
 Comparison of the HC group vs All PDs (the two PD groups combined) repeated the 
Group main effect for semantic recall, F (1, 62) = 8.82, p < 0.01. Similarly, there was a main 
effect for Epoch, F (2, 248) = 20.41, p < .0001, Trial, F (1, 62) = 22.45, p < .0001, Epoch x 
Trial, F (2,248) = 5.98, p < .01. In this instance (HC vs all PD), the Group x Epoch x Trial 
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interaction just failed to reach significance, F (2, 248) = 2.65, p = .07. No other HC Group x 
All PD group effects were found, Group x Epoch, F (2, 248) = 1.06, p > 0.1; Group x Trial, F 
(1, 62) < 1.0, p > 0.1. Separate analysis restricted to the two PD groups confirmed no main 
effect, F (1, 38) < 1.0, p > 0.1; and in particular no PD-Group x Trial interaction, F (1, 38) < 
0.1, p > 0.1; or PD-Group x Epoch interaction, F (2, 150) = 1.01, p > 0.1, on the AMI 
semantic memory score.  
3.3.1.2  EAMI semantic memory: post-trial 
The EAMI life periods overlapped with the AMI, but it also included a fourth life period, 
Later Adulthood (age 45 to 6 years ago). Like the AMI, each life period contained three 
events. End-of-trial performance between the three groups on the EAMI semantic subscale 
showed a significant main effect for Epoch, F (3, 183) = 18.99, p < 0.001, with semantic 
recall scores showing a mild increase from Childhood to Adulthood, but then decreasing for 
the Recent Life period (Figure 3.4A). Non-significant values were returned for the Group 
effect, F (2, 61) = 2.25, p > 0.1, and the Group x Epoch interaction effects, F (6, 183) = 1.90, 
p > 0.1. However, a Group main effect approached significance when the HC Group was 
compared with All PD combined, F (1, 62) = 3.52, p < .07, and a Group x Epoch interaction 
effect also emerged, F (3, 186) = 3.61, p < .05. The latter interaction reflected poorer 
semantic recall for Later Adulthood and especially the most recent period for All PD 
compared to the HC group (Figure 3.4B). This interaction effect remained when controlling 
for Age, Sex and Education, F (3, 186) = 3.61, p < .05; Age, Sex, Education, all p > 0.1.  
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Figure 3.4. End-of-Trial EAMI mean semantic scores across life periods for A) PD-active, PD-
passive and HC groups; and B) HC and All PD groups. The maximum score for Childhood is 34 
points per participant (Before School = 10 points; Primary School = 10 points; High School = 14 
points). The maximum score for all other life periods is 14 points per participant. Abbreviations: HC 
= Healthy control, PD = Parkinson’s disease. 
  
64 
3.3.1.3 EAMI semantic memory: post-trial Childhood life period sub-analysis 
The three age periods of the EAMI Childhood period were subjected to a sub-analysis to 
more closely scrutinize semantic recall between ages 0-5 (before school), ages 5-11 (primary 
school), and 11-18 (high school). Group performance of the two PD groups and HC group are 
presented in Figure 3.5. There were no differences in performance between the HC, PD-
active and PD-passive groups, F (2, 61) < 1.0, p > 0.1; or any change in performance across 
Epoch, F (2, 122) = 1.22, p > 0.1; or Group x Epoch interaction effect, F (4, 122) < 1.0, p > 
0.1. These findings were replicated when comparing All PD vs HC Group, F (1, 62) <1.0, p > 
0.1; Epoch, F (2, 124) = 1.23, p > 0.1; Group x Epoch, F (2, 124) < 1.0, p > 0.1). 
 
Figure 3.5. End-of-trial EAMI semantic scores for PD-active, PD-passive and HC groups across the 
Childhood life period. Before School and Primary School sub-periods are scored from a maximum of 
ten points, and High School from 14 points per participant. Abbreviations: HC = Healthy control; PD 
= Parkinson’s disease. 
 Episodic memory 3.3.2
The AMI was used as a measure of baseline and end-of-trial episodic memory performance. 
To recap, the AMI episodic schedule examined performance of episodic recall over three life 
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periods, Childhood (ages 0-18), Early Adulthood (ages 18-30) and Recent Life (within the 
last five-to-six years). Three episodic events were allocated to each life period. Each event 
was scored from three points, and thus each life period in the AMI was scored from a 
maximum of nine points. The EAMI was used as a second measure of end-of-trial episodic 
memory to investigate the presence of sensory-perceptual and other contextual details 
associated with episodic memory and autonoesis. With the EAMI, however, each event was 
scored from a maximum of 7 points, so that each life period in the EAMI was scored from a 
maximum of 21 points. To simplify comparisons, event scores for both the AMI and EAMI 
schedules were converted to percentages for all episodic (and semantic) baseline and end-of-
trial analyses.  
3.3.2.1 Criteria and selection of episodic memories 
Post-trial AMI and EAMI episodic memory scores were analysed using two methods. The 
first method included all episodic ABMs collected at end-of-trial and is the main analysis 
referred to in the body of these results. Another analysis exclusively examined episodic 
memories that were different to the memories provided at baseline.  
 The main analysis, which includes all episodic memories reported regardless of 
whether they were elicited previously at baseline, excluded for the PD-active group the three 
memories per participant that had been elaborated during the trial ( Table 3-2). These 
excluded memories could not be used because, as rehearsed memories, they could have 
conferred a scoring advantage to the PD-active group. Of the PD-active group, there were 
two participants who spontaneously produced three memories at end-of-trial that had been 
elaborated during the trial, and which were identified by the “blind” interviewer via reference 
to the ‘Event Avoid’ sheet. On each of these three occasions the participants were explicitly 
asked to report a different memory, but they could not. Therefore, the elaborated memories 
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were substituted with unrehearsed ‘replacement baseline’ memories gathered during the 
earliest memory elaboration sessions. 
3.3.2.2 Missing episodic values  
For the main results, there were some missing episodic memory scores in the end-of-trial 
Childhood life period. For one PD-passive group participant, two of the three Childhood 
period events (event 1.1., event 1.2.) were not requested by the “blind” interviewer. This 
person’s Childhood period score was designated as a ‘missing’ value, rather than using the 
single event obtained (event 1.3., age 11-18), because differences in memories recalled across 
the three Childhood sub-periods (before school, primary school, high school) were deemed as 
potentially too variable. 
 For one PD-active group participant, event 1.3 (high school) could not be included for 
end-of-trial analysis because it had been a baseline ‘elaboration’ memory and was therefore 
to be avoided. The mean Childhood period score for this PD participant was therefore also re-
designated as a ‘missing’ value. For the same participant, a second event (2.1.), from the 
Early Adulthood period, was also excluded because it was an elaborated baseline event. In 
this instance, however, the participant’s Early Adulthood period total was calculated as the 
mean of the two remaining events (events 2.2., 2.3.). These small variations in sample cell 
size could be accommodated by the multi-level linear model used for analyses. 
3.3.2.3 Treatment of episodic data 
 The following results also include three memories from two participants in the PD-
active group that are ‘replacement baseline’ events. On each of these occasions, participants 
initially produced a memory from baseline that was elaborated during the trial, but they were 
unable to generate an alternative memory independently when asked to do so. To reiterate, if 
participants gave a baseline memory on the first pass, it would be identified quickly by the 
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interviewer via reference to the Avoid Events sheet. Participants would then be explicitly 
asked to think of an alternative memory. If they could not, investigation of the baseline 
memory was resumed. For PD-active participants however, if these same initial 
circumstances involved elaborated baseline events (1.3, 2.1, 4.3), resumption of the ‘baseline’ 
memory would instead use an unrehearsed ‘replacement baseline’ memory. Therefore, there 
are three of these substitute memories in the PD-active episodic data values set. The analysis 
also includes 23 events that were awarded zero scores on both AMI and EAMI end-of-trial 
measures, because participants failed to generate any memory at all. A summary of data 
treatment is presented in Table 3-2.  
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Table 3-2. Organisation of end-of-trial AMI and EAMI episodic memory data. Letters represent 
different types of data treatment across life periods and participant groups. 
 
Childhood 
(Ages 0 - 18) 
Early Adulthood 
(Ages 18 - 30) 
Later Adulthood 
(Age 45 –  
> last 6 yrs) 
Recent Life 
(< last six yrs) 
Total Events 
 1.1 1.2 1.3 2.1 2.2 2.3 3.1 3.2 3.3 4.1 4.2 4.3 AMI EAMI 
HC 
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Note. AMI baseline and end-of-trial episodic analyses were based on Childhood, Early Adulthood and Recent 
Life periods only. EAMI end-of-trial analyses also include the Later Adulthood life period (shaded). a = 1 event 
excluded from post-trial analyses because it was a baseline event used in memory elaboration sessions. This 
event’s Childhood period score was re-assigned ‘Missing’ for post-trial AMI and EAMI analyses. For Childhood 
period post-trial sub-analyses, events 1.1., 1.2. were reinstated. b = 1 event excluded from post-trial analyses 
because it was a baseline event used in memory elaboration sessions. This event’s Early Adulthood life period 
score was calculated using the mean percentage score of the two remaining events. c = 2 baseline memories 
provided by the same participant that could not be scored as they were not investigated. This Childhood epoch 
was re-designated a ‘Missing’ value. (For Childhood life period post-trial sub-analysis, event 1.3. was reinstated). 
d = 3 ‘replacement’ baseline events that were used because an elaborated event was spontaneously provided, and 
the participant could not think of an alternative memory. e = 23 events across 18 participants, who failed to recall 
any memories and were awarded zero scores across AMI and EAMI (n = 6 HC / n = 8 PD-active / n = 4 PD-
passive). f = 34 baseline events included in the main analysis at end-of-trial. For 17 of these events (HC = 5, PD-
active = 7, PD-passive = 5), participants were explicitly asked to think of an alternative event but could not. For 
17 of these events (f
1
; PD-active = 6, PD-passive = 11), participants were not explicitly asked to think of an 
alternative event (administrative error). Bolded events 1.3, 2.1, 4.2. = memory elaboration baseline events. 
Abbreviations: AMI = Autobiographical Memory Interview; EAMI = Episodic Autobiographical Memory 
Interview; HC =Healthy control, PD = Parkinson’s disease. 
3.3.2.4 AMI episodic memory: pre vs. post-trial 
The percent mean episodic memory scores for the AMI in the three groups across life 
periods, both at baseline and at end-of-trial, are shown in Figure 3.6. Superior recall was 
evident in the HC group with a Group main effect, F (2, 61) = 6.19, p < 0.01; irrespective of 
trial, Group x Trial, F (2, 61) < 1.0, p > 0.1); or life period, Group x Epoch, F (4, 242) < 1.0, 
p > 0.1; Group x Epoch x Trial, F (4, 242) < 1.0; p > 0.1. Although years of Education were 
related to performance (F (1, 58) = 6.80, p < 0.05, the main effect of Group remained when 
covariates were included, F (2, 58) = 6.74, p < 0.01; Sex and Age, both p > 0.1. Pairwise 
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contrasts (Tukey) confirmed that the HC group had better episodic memory recall on the 
AMI than both the PD-active group (p < 0.02) and the PD-passive group (p < 0.01); HC vs 
All PD, F (1, 62) = 12.48, p < 0.001). However, between HC and All PD, there was no main 
effect for Trial, F (1, 62) = .72, p > 0.1; or Epoch, F (2, 246) = 1.07, p > 0.1. Separate 
analysis restricted to the two PD groups confirmed no PD-Group main effect, F (1, 38) < 1.0, 
p > 0.1; and in particular no PD-Group x Trial interaction on the AMI episodic memory 
score, F (1, 38) < 1.0, p > 0.1. 
 
Figure 3.6. Baseline and end-of-trial AMI episodic memory scores for PD-active, PD-passive and HC 
groups across life periods. Each life period was typically scored from a maximum of nine points per 
participant (three events per life period). Abbreviations: T1 = Trial 1; T2 = Trial 2 (end-of-trial). 
 The only other effect in the main analysis was an Epoch x Trial interaction, F (2, 242) 
= 6.76, p < 0.01, which was replicated in the analysis for HC vs All PD, F (2, 246) = 6.78, p 
< 0.01; and for the two PD groups, F (2, 150) = 3.73, p < 0.05. When each life period was 
compared between baseline and end-of-trial, combined across all participants, AMI episodic 
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memory recall at end of trial showed a clear decrease for the Childhood period (0 – 18 yrs), 
showed a mild increase for Early Adulthood period (18 – 30yrs) and a mild decrease for 
Recent Life period (last 5 yrs at baseline and 6 yrs to one year ago at end-of-trial; Figure 3.7).  
 
Figure 3.7. Baseline and end-of-trial AMI episodic memory recall collapsed across groups, analysed 
with all event memories included. Abbreviations: T1 = Trial 1 (baseline), T2 = Trial 2 (end-of-trial). 
 
Figure 3.8. Baseline and end-of-trial AMI event memory recall collapsed across groups, analysed 
with only non-baseline memories. Abbreviations: T1 = Trial 1 (baseline), T2 = Trial 2 (end-of-trial). 
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 Figure 3.8 shows the results of an analysis which is restricted only to episodic 
memories for events not given previously at baseline (described in Appendix J). That is, these 
events were spontaneously provided on the first request by the examiner, or were provided 
after participants were asked to give a different memory (Table 3-2). For this analysis (of 
only memories that were different to baseline), recall for Early Adulthood and Recent Life 
was relatively stable between baseline and end-of-trial. By contrast, there was significantly 
poorer recall for Childhood at end-of-trial, Epoch x Trial F (2, 243) = 9.71, p < 0.0001; Trial 
F (1, 61) = 5.11, p < .05; Epoch F (2, 243) = 4.45, p < .05). When Figure 3.8 is compared 
with Figure 3.7, the childhood drop for end-of-trial versus baseline is clearer and suggests 
that fewer memory examples from childhood are available, such that a focus on only non-
repeated items exacerbates childhood recall at the end of testing. 
3.3.2.5 EAMI episodic memory: post-trial 
For the EAMI, which was only conducted at end-of-trial, the HC group again showed 
superior recall, Group main effect, F (2, 61) = 5.13, p < 0.01, with no difference between the 
PD-active and PD-passive groups, F (1, 38) < 1.0; Figure 3.9). There was, however, clear 
evidence of a very strong Epoch main effect for the EAMI, F (3, 181) = 28.93, p < 0.0001, 
irrespective of group, Group x Epoch, F (6, 181) = 1.28, p > 0.1. Again, Education was 
related to recall, F (1, 58) = 4.54, p < 0.05, but inclusion of education, age and sex covariates 
did not change the Group main effect, F (2, 58) = 5.31, p < 0.01; Age and Sex, all p > 0.1. 
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Figure 3.9. End-of-trial EAMI episodic scores across life periods for PD-active, PD-passive and HC 
groups. Each life period was typically scored from a maximum of 21 points per participant (three 
events per life period). Abbreviations: HC = Healthy control, PD = Parkinson’s disease 
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3.3.2.6 EAMI episodic memory: post-trial Childhood life period sub-analysis 
As shown in Figure 3.10, closer examination of Childhood EAMI scores revealed no 
difference between the three groups for very early childhood (0 – 5 yrs), but no improvement 
in the PD patients with age during the Childhood period, whereas the HC group produced 
superior recall for middle (5 – 11yrs) and late (11 – 18 yrs) childhood. This pattern was 
supported by a significant Group x Epoch interaction across the Childhood sub-epochs, F (2, 
121) = 3.07, p < 0.05); this interaction survived adjustment for covariates (p < 0.05).  
 
 
Figure 3.10. EAMI mean episodic scores across Childhood for PD-active, PD-passive and HC groups 
at end-of-trial. Each sub-period was scored from a maximum 7 points per participant (one event per 
sub-period). Abbreviations: HC = Healthy controls; PD = Parkinson’s disease. 
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Chapter 4: Discussion 
The aim of the current study was to investigate the effects of a combined cognitive and 
physical intervention package on autobiographical memory and cognitive theory of mind, in 
Parkinson’s disease participants. Participants were randomized into intervention (PD-active) 
and control arms (PD-passive), stratified on the basis of risk of progression to MCI over the 
next four years. Their performance was compared with age, sex and education-matched HC 
participants. 
4.1 Theory of Mind 
Cognitive theory of mind was examined with a card sorting task (Langdon et al., 1997) at 
baseline and end-of-trial. Overall, PD participants performed similarly to the HC group. 
However, the PD-active group performed more poorly at baseline than the PD-passive and 
HC group in the False Belief condition, but improved on this measure at end-of-trial to match 
the performance of the other two groups. No differences were found between groups on all 
other conditions. Comparability with the level and pattern of scores reported by Mengelbert 
and Siegert (2003) and the current data for the three control conditions support the reliability 
of the current findings. The Mechanical and Social Script conditions yielded similar high 
scores in all groups, and performance in the more challenging Capture condition was on par 
with False Belief mean group scores. 
 Studies to date in cognitive ToM have reported impairments in non-dementing PD 
participants when compared with controls (Kawamura and Koyama, 2007; Mengelbert and 
Siegert, 2003; Roca et al., 2000; Salzman et al., 2000). In the current analysis, only the poorer 
baseline mean score of the PD-active group in the False Belief condition was consistent with 
the general findings in the literature. 
 The card sorting task reported in this study has, however, been used only twice 
previously in PD. Mengelberg and Siegert (2003) reported poorer performance of PD 
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participants in the False Belief condition, with a mean score that was almost identical to the 
current findings of the PD-active group at baseline. This mean performance score in PD was 
replicated by Nicolson (2016). Her study examined patients at baseline who participated in 
the current trial. The majority of Nicolson’s PD patients (fifteen) were among the first 
randomized into the Enrichment trial and are included in the present analysis. This participant 
overlap allows consideration of what factors may have influenced the better performance of 
the PD-passive group at baseline, which was commensurate with that of the HC group.  
 It is possible that the improvement in performance of the PD-active group at end-of-
trial was due to some benefits associated with the intervention. The PD-passive group 
showed only a mild, non-significant decline from baseline to end-of-trial. Based on the 
equivalent mean performance of the PD-passive group and PD-active groups at end-of trial, it 
is possible that the PD group examined in this ToM study may have been at an earlier stage 
of cognitive impairment than those tested by Mengelbert and Siegert (2003). Alternatively, 
the ToM deficit may be a specific deficit that is relevant only to a subset of non-dementing 
PD patients, and this deficit may be sensitive to non-pharmacological intervention. 
 The poorer baseline False Belief performance in the PD-active group was unrelated to 
deficits in more general cognition, because their mean scores in the other conditions, which 
controlled for sequencing deficits unrelated to ToM, was comparable to those in the HC 
group. 
 Mengelbert and Siegert (2003) also reported that PD participants with higher levels of 
depression performed more poorly on ToM tasks than PD participants with lower levels of 
depression. In the current study, however, the poorer ToM performance at baseline for the 
PD-active group versus the PD-passive group was unlikely to have been related to scores on 
depression or anxiety, as there were no significant correlations between these measures. 
Although the PD group as a whole had significantly higher baseline HADS anxiety and 
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depression scores than the HC group, there were no differences between the two PD groups 
for depression or anxiety. It also seems unlikely that the difference in findings derives from 
the use of different depression inventories (BDI versus HADS) as opposed to other 
methodological differences, especially the cognitive skills of participants in the two studies. 
 Other studies using alternative measures of cognitive ToM indicate that a selective 
impairment is present in at least moderate-stage PD, with preserved performance at earlier 
clinical stages (Kawamura & Koyama, 2007; Peron et al., 2009; Roca et al., 2010). Cognitive 
ToM is associated with the dorsolateral PFC and the central executive network. Therefore, if 
the Enrichment trial intervention has had any effect on cognitive ToM performance, it may be 
related more to activation of other brain networks than the DMN, which recruits medial 
portions of the PFC and is implicated in affective ToM. PD impairment in affective ToM 
typically emerges at later stages of the disease process (Poletti et al., 2012). As such, 
longitudinal follow up of the Enrichment trial cohort using an affective ToM task at a later 
stage, may shed light on whether there has been any long-term benefit of intervention on PD-
vulnerable brain regions associated with the DMN. It will be important to follow the progress 
of both PD-active and PD-passive groups on this cognitive ToM card sorting task over time. 
If there has been an effect of intervention, the performance of the PD-passive group would be 
expected to fall compared to the PD-active group. This will help to establish whether an 
intervention effect has occurred at all, as based on this particular cognitive measure. 
4.2 Autobiographical memory 
Personal episodic and semantic ABM was measured with the Autobiographical Memory 
Interview (Kopelman et al., 1989). At end-of-trial, an adapted version of the Episodic 
Autobiographical Memory Interview (EAMI; Irish et al., 2008), was incorporated to facilitate 
a more fine-grained analysis of the contextual detail of episodic memories (Irish et al., 2008). 
This allowed scoring using both the AMI and EAMI. For the AMI, both personal semantic 
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memory and episodic memory was poorer in the PD participants than the HC groups. For 
semantic memory, based on the AMI, the PD-active group showed an intermediate level of 
recall between the HC group and PD-passive group, but there was no clear effect of 
intervention per se. On both the AMI and EAMI, all groups showed a drop in semantic 
memory for Recent Life at the end-of trial compared to Recent Life at baseline. This may 
have been due to the exclusion of the last 12 months for end-of-trial testing. For episodic 
recall using the AMI scoring method, both PD groups performed more poorly than the HC 
group and there was no effect of intervention. The more detailed autonoetic-based scoring 
afforded by the EAMI suggested that PD episodic memory at end-of-trial was poorer for 
more later adulthood and recent memory and that Childhood and Early Adulthood episodic 
memories were not impaired, compared with the HC group. However there was no significant 
interaction, and again, overall, results showed poorer recall in the PD groups versus the HC 
group and no effect of intervention.  
 AMI semantic memory 4.2.1
The impaired semantic recall in the PD group compared with HC group on the AMI, 
contrasts with a previous report examining personal semantic memory in PD. Smith et al. 
(2010) found that PDs showed relatively little difficulty in recalling autobiographical 
knowledge compared with events. Using the autobiographical fluency task, they reported no 
difference between PD and HC in recall frequency of names associated with each of five life 
periods. Smith et al. (2010) tested 16 PDs and 16 HC, whereas the current study compared 40 
PD and 24 HC. Apart from procedural differences, it is possible that the earlier study was not 
powered to detect impaired semantic memory in PD. For the AMI, the current study found a 
temporal gradient with higher recall for Recent Life, which is a typical finding using the AMI 
(Piolino et al., 2002). This contrasts with the findings of Smith et al. (2010), who reported a 
lower frequency of names recalled in the last two time periods for both HC and PD groups. It 
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is possible though that using just one type of personal semantic knowledge (recall of names) 
may have biased results. These results also do not reflect the findings in the literature more 
generally, which is that semantic memory tends to stabilise and improve with age (Piolino et 
al., 2002). 
 It is unlikely that the time lag between assessment points contributed to the lower 
semantic scores for all groups at end-of-trial compared with baseline, again because semantic 
memory recall in normal ageing is relatively immune to age and retention effects (Irish et al., 
2010). Rather, fatigue effects may have contributed to lower performances, as the end-of-trial 
assessment was three times the length of baseline (40 minutes: 2 hours). Fatigue is one of the 
more insidious symptoms of PD and tends to develop early in the disease process. It may 
have mediated the particularly low end-of-trial scores of the two PD groups for Recent Life 
compared with baseline, as this was the last section of the extended end-of-trial ABM 
interview.  
 It is possible that performance was also influenced by the exclusion of the twelve 
months leading up to test date for some questions, which was necessary to avoid the 
Enrichment trial and maintain ‘blind’ retesting conditions. As participants were unable to use 
places or names that applied to the last 12 months, questions that could have been answered 
easily at baseline may have been inapplicable at end-of-trial and resulted in low scores. For 
example, participants were asked to provide the names of neighbours from within the last six 
years but excluding the previous twelve months (S.4.4.5). For many, this would be difficult to 
answer unless they had neighbours who had moved out between one and five years ago 
 Therefore, this question could have been improved; however it was also a priority to 
keep amendments to the AMI as minimal as possible to retain continuity with the baseline 
schedule. Overall, five of 15 AMI questions (eight from 21 points) were affected by such 
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readjustments (S.4.4.1. - S.4.4.5.), and therefore the possible effect on scores cannot be 
discounted. 
 There were no significant differences in performance between the PD-active and PD-
passive groups on the AMI semantic schedule. The PD-active group was, however, not 
significantly different to the HC group across the two trial points. Inferring any intervention 
effects in the slightly higher scores of the PD-active group at end-of-trial is compromised 
because of this group’s higher scores at baseline also. The sample size in the two PD groups 
was relatively low, so an increased sample size would provide a better test of whether there is 
a beneficial effect of the Enrichment programme for Childhood and Early Adulthood events, 
suggested by Figure 3.10. 
 EAMI semantic memory 4.2.2
Performance on the EAMI semantic subscale between HC and PD groups for semantic 
memories differed for Later Adulthood only, especially Recent Life. This pattern of PD 
group impairment was similar to that of the aMCI group reported by Irish et al. (2010), in 
which EAMI semantic recall deficits began to emerge from the Middle Adulthood period 
onward (this period was not included for analysis in the current study due to time constraints 
on the length of testing). All groups showed a decline in EAMI semantic memory for recent 
life, and the more pronounced deficit at this epoch for the PD groups, may, again, have been 
influenced by fatigue during the final stages of the interview process. By comparison, the HC 
group performance for Recent Life was almost the same as for Childhood life period, as it 
was for the elderly control group used in the study by Irish et al. (2010). The similar semantic 
recall scores for Childhood life period for both HC and PD groups highlights the relative 
resistance of semantic recall to the effects of age compared with episodic memory. This 
finding also highlights the intactness of PD semantic recall for earlier years. Sub-analysis of 
the Childhood period shows comparable performance with HC across age periods. From 
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these results, it appears that decrements in semantic recall in PD emerge in Later Adulthood. 
However this may occur sooner, as it appears to in aMCI (Irish et al., 2010). Future work 
should look to explore semantic recall performance in Middle Adulthood.  
 Overall, the PD and HC groups showed similar performance gradients on the AMI 
and EAMI semantic schedules at end-of-trial. A major procedural difference between the two 
scales was the addition of Later Adulthood life period in the EAMI, which facilitated closer 
examination of semantic recall across the life span. These aspects of investigation are 
important because age related temporal gradients in PD personal ABM are not well-
characterized in the literature. Unlike the EAMI, however, the AMI semantic memory scores 
showed differences between the groups across all life periods (Childhood, Young Adulthood, 
and Recent Life) when aggregating baseline and end-of-trial scores. Hence the EAMI and the 
AMI may produce a different pattern when comparing PD and HC groups. This might be 
explained by the AMI semantic schedule containing more specific, and date-based questions 
relating to particular themes (e.g. a wedding, children, hospitals and institutions) than the 
EAMI, which rotates names of people, activities of living and one important date across its 
life periods  
  AMI episodic memory 4.2.3
Findings on the AMI episodic schedule showed a robust difference in recall between the PD 
group and HC group across the three life periods, with less detail recalled by the PD group. 
Although personal ABM has not been widely researched in PD, the deficit in recall of detail, 
suggested by the lower scores of the PD group on this scale, are consistent with the findings 
of previous investigations (Nicolson, 2016; Sagar et al., 1988; Smith et al., 2010; Souchay & 
Smith, 2013); as well as studies which have examined episodic memory for public events and 
source memory (Gabrieli et al. (1996); Johnson et al. (2005); as cited by Souchay and Smith 
(2013)). Compared with baseline, end-of-trial AMI episodic scores were higher for Early 
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Adulthood, remained stable for Recent Life and got significantly worse for Childhood life 
period. Low recall for events from Childhood period at end-of-trial reduced further when 
analyses excluded memories not previously produced at baseline testing, suggesting fewer 
exemplars may be available during this period. However, overall these findings did not 
produce any clear evidence of a temporal gradient. The similar pattern of scores across life 
periods on the semantic and episodic schedules at end-of-trial, suggests a lack of 
discrimination between specific and more general, semanticised levels of event detail, which 
is a noted limitation of the AMI (Piolino et al., 2002). Absence of clear temporal effects is 
consistent with the findings of Sagar et al. (1988) using the cue-word task, but not Smith et 
al. (2010), who found evidence of greater impairment for more recent life periods on the 
autobiographical fluency task. There was, however, no discernible effect of intervention on 
episodic recall in this study, as PD-active and PD-passive groups showed no differences in 
scores at end-of-trial. 
 EAMI episodic memory 4.2.4
Performance on the EAMI episodic subscale also showed that the HC group recalled more 
contextual details for events than the PD group across all four life periods examined. For the 
HC group, memories for events became increasingly contextually detailed in more recent life 
periods, which is consistent with the gradient of recall in elderly controls reported by Irish et 
al. (2010). The same general pattern was evident in the PD participants. The suggestion of an 
improvement only for early adult life after intervention was not statistically supported; it may 
provide a target hypothesis for future study. More pronounced deficits have been reported for 
aMCI and, unsurprisingly, in AD (Irish et al., 2011a; Irish et al., 2010). An EAMI sub-
analysis of the Childhood period showed that the superior episodic recall for the HC group 
was not evident for events prior to school, consistent with the indications in the literature that 
fewer memories are encoded before six years of age, with almost none encoded before the 
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age of three (Piolino et al., 2002). Clearly, however, PD can impede recall of events even 
during teenage years. This pattern of results suggests that even in early PD, when cognition is 
relatively intact using standardised neuropsychological tests, the disease has a negative 
impact on episodic memory across the lifespan, not just for recent periods since the onset of 
the illness. This was suggested by the preliminary findings of Nicolson (2016), and has been 
confirmed using measures that more directly capture the sense of autonoetic re-experiencing 
that is central to a truly episodic memory. To the author’s knowledge, this is the first time 
these findings have been shown in the research literature.  
 Overall, results showed no major differences in performance between the PD-active 
and PD-passive participants at end-of-trial assessment on these semantic and episodic 
measures of ABM. This may be due to a lack of sufficient sample numbers and power, or that 
any effects of intervention on ABM performance may emerge over the long-term and at 
future follow-up assessments points. The other alternative is that there are no effects of the 
intervention, either now or in the future. 
  Long-term follow up will be critical considering the intervention itself was designed 
using the most current evidence to show benefits to cognition of physical and cognitive 
exercise in PD (Bloem et al., 2015; Hindle et al., 2015; Hindle et al., 2013). It is also possible 
that negative findings on the ABM measure was due to disguised intervention effects, 
resulting from uncontrollable factors such as generally more vigorous lifestyles within the 
PD-passive group than the PD-active group. Another consideration is that the heterogeneity 
of PD symptoms across individuals meant that patients within the PD-active arm may have 
benefited differentially from the intervention regimen (Bloem et al., 2015). It will be possible 
to explore these and other possible influencing factors further in the future, as the participants 
in this study were well-characterised due to regular and comprehensive collection of clinical, 
ecological and lifestyle data.  
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Chapter 5: Summary, limitations and concluding remarks 
The aim of the current study was to examine performance on tasks measuring 
autobiographical memory and cognitive theory of mind in a cohort of well-characterized non-
MCI PD patients, as part of a two-armed randomized controlled trial assessing the effects of a 
lifestyle intervention package on cognitive performance. Part of the novelty of this research 
was the inclusion of an adapted version of the Episodic Autobiographical Memory Interview 
(EAMI; Irish et al., 2010), which allowed analysis of contextual details associated with the 
experience of episodic recall. Both episodic autobiographical memory and theory of mind are 
associated with brain regions that form part of the default mode network, which shows 
evidence of reduced functional connectivity in cognitively unimpaired PD (Tessitore et al., 
2012). 
5.1 Key findings 
The intervention was designed to target large scale brain networks that are vulnerable in PD 
including the default mode network, which was targeted with a subset of cognitive exercises 
and memory elaboration sessions.  
 Our findings showed that memory for personal facts and events was poorer in the PD 
participant group compared with HC. Of particular interest was that PD participants showed 
impairment in the recall of contextual details associated with the autonoetic experience of 
episodic recall, which suggests that even in early PD, episodic memory is affected across the 
lifespan and prior to the onset of the illness. Contrary to our expectations, we did not find any 
clear evidence of an effect of the intervention in measures of ABM, as there were no 
differences in performance between the active and passive PD groups. This is most likely to 
have been due to the low power of the study.  
 For cognitive Theory of Mind, our findings showed the PD-active group performed 
more poorly at baseline than the PD-passive and HC group, but matched their performance at 
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end-of-trial assessment. As cognitive ToM is more closely associated with other large-scale 
brain networks than the default mode network, it is possible that elements of the intervention 
targeting such networks may have conferred some beneficial effect on performance. 
5.2 Limitations 
Study limitations related predominantly to the ABM aspect of this study rather than to the 
examination of ToM.  One concerned the ‘blinded’ end-of-trial testing conditions between 
the PD and HC group. One assessor tested the PD participants, and another tested the HC 
group, which raises the possibility that the data may have been vulnerable to interrater 
variability. Notwithstanding, the AMI and EAMI semantic interview schedule questions were 
scripted to reduce this risk. Similarly, the structured format of the EAMI involved a 
systematic, checklist-style approach which testers were encouraged not to deviate from.  
 The difference in the length of interviews between baseline and end-of-trial may have 
had a fatigue effect that affected results, although participants were offered refreshments 
throughout. Findings may also have been influenced by the small variations made to the 
format of the AMI for follow-up testing. 
 The difference in episodic scoring methodology between PD and HC groups may 
have influenced the findings. Event interviews with all PD participants were transcribed and 
scored off paper. However due to time constraints, events for the HC group were scored from 
audio. Efforts were made to ensure consistency of scoring, including scoring HC events only 
after completion of the PD groups to ensure proficiency was accurate and efficient. Also, 
regular checks for consistency were made. PD event material was re-scored regularly from 
audio and compared with scores based off transcribed material.  
 Despite these limitations, to the best of our knowledge this study is the first within the 
framework of PD to examine details of event recall closely associated with autonoesis and 
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episodic memory and find impairment; and also find impairment in recall for personal 
semantic memory.  
5.3 Future Directions 
This combined physical and cognitive enrichment intervention package was designed using 
the most current evidence that show benefits to cognition of physical and cognitive exercise 
in PD (Hindle et al., 2013). Although the sample size was relatively small, findings suggest 
that a relatively intensive combination of cognitive and physical exercises does not benefit 
PD participants prior to an MCI status. However, further follow up is required to test whether 
intervention effects emerge over the longer term. 
 For ABM, future directions include further assessment of aspects of the semantic and 
episodic memory assessments; and for ToM, follow-up will concern investigating the 
progress of both PD-active and PD-passive groups on this card sorting task over time. 
Introduction of an affective theory of mind task would also provide an additional measure of 
the DMN alongside the measures of personal ABM. This is of particular importance in PD, 
on the basis of fMRI evidence which indicates reduced functional integrity of the default 
mode network even in patients with relatively normal cognition.  
 Long-term follow up is critical considering the intervention itself was designed using 
the most current evidence to show benefits to cognition of physical and cognitive exercise in 
PD (Bloem et al., 2015; Hindle et al., 2015; Hindle et al., 2013).  In future studies with larger 
sample sizes, subgrouping and clustering of PD patients based on cognitive and motor 
symptom profiles may also be beneficial to examining whether subgroups benefit 
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Appendix A: Theory of Mind card sorting task  
Scripted instructions 
Place the pile of cars in front of you facing the participant. 
“In front of me I have a pile of cards. A set is made of four cards. On the back of each card is 
a number. The number does not mean anything. I simply use the numbers to pre-arrange a 
mixed-up order of stories for each person to see. There are also coloured dots. I simply use 
these to record the order of cards when you’ve arranged them. I am going to put these four 
cards face-down in front of you.”  
 Place the cards in the pre-arranged order on the table face-down.  
“When we are ready to start, I will ask you to turn the cards over. You can do that in any 
order that you like, that’s entirely up to you. Once you have turned the cards over, your task 
is to line the cards up in a straight line, like a comic-strip, first card here, second card here, 
etc.”  
Point to where you want the cards lined up on the table.  
“You need to arrange the cards in the correct order so that they show a logical sequence of 
events. When you are happy that you have the cards in the correct order, or that you have 
done your best to work out an order that makes the most sense, I want you to say ‘finished’. I 
will be using this stopwatch to record how long you take from the time that I say turn the 
cards over ‘now’ to the time that you say ‘finished’. Having said that, I don’t want you to 
worry about being timed. It is more important to get the cards in the correct order than it is to 
be fast. Let’s try the first story. This is a practice so that you can get used to doing the task. 
When I say ‘now’, I want you to turn the cards over. Ready, turn the cards over now”. 
Start the stopwatch on ‘now’, and proceed to give the participant feedback as to whether they 
were correct or not. Also use this teddy-bear picture sequence to point out to subjects that 
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these are not the sort of picture sequences where every detail of the story is shown on every 
card.  
“Notice that in this sequence you can’t tell that the boy wants the teddy-bear until the last 
card. In all of the sequences that you will do the cards are like that. You will need to make 
some inferences to work out how best to put the cards together. Now we’ll do a second 
practice” and proceed as above. 
“Now we’ll move on to the other stories. There are 16 stories in total. You may find that 
some of these stories are less straightforward than others. If you find a set of cards confusing, 
just do your best to put the cards in an order which you think is the most sensible. You will 
see the 16 stories in a mixed-up order. That means that the stories will not start out easy and 
get progressively harder. You might do one story that seems a bit confusing and then the very 
next story could be very easy. Just work through each story at your own pace. Do you have 
any questions? OK, let’s start with this story”. 
Lay the first story out in the predetermined order (L-R for participant. R-L from examiner’s 
view). Say, “You can turn the cards over now”. Begin timing. Stop timing when the 
participant indicates they are finished and record the order of the cards on the score sheet and 
the time taken. Pickup from R-L from examiner’s view and fan downwards. Record any 
errors before allowing the participant to fix them.  
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Appendix C: Examples of the four DMN cognitive tasks 
Examples of the four cognitive tasks from the Enrichment Trial designed to stimulate the 
Default Mode Network: Moral Dilemmas; Reading the Mind in the Eyes; Envisioning the 
Future; Faux Pas Story. 
C.1. Moral dilemmas task 
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Choose and circle which word best describes what the person in the picture is thinking or 
feeling.  
 
Panicked   Flustered   Angry 
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C.3. Envisioning the future task 
.  
113 
C.4. Faux pas story task  
Story 1. Kim's cousin, Scott, was coming to visit and Kim made an apple pie especially for 
him.After dinner, she said, "I made a pie just for you. It's in the kitchen.""Mmmm," replied 
Scott, "It smells great! I love pies, except for apple, of course." 
1. 1.Did anyone say something they shouldn't have said or something awkward? If yes, 
continue with all questions. If no, skip to question 7. 
2. Who said something they shouldn't have said or something awkward? 
3. Why shouldn't he/she have said it or why was it awkward? 
4. Why do you think he/she said it? 
5. When he smelled the pie, did Scott know it was an apple pie? 
6. How do you think Kim felt? 
7. In the story, what kind of pie did Kim make? 
8. How did Kim and Scott know each other. 
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Appendix D: Elaboration session sketches of participant homes 
from childhood and early adulthood 
Participants’ sketches of their homes from childhood and early adulthood, drawn during the 





Appendix E: Example memories provided at baseline 
Three AMI events provided at baseline by one participant who was later randomized into the 
PD-Enrichment Intervention trial arm.  These memories were used for memory elaboration 
sessions. Reproduced with permission. All names have been changed. 
E.1. Event 1.3. An event from high school 
There were many (events). James Cowan and I used to play golf pretty much every night of 
the week, the school had an 18 hole golf course at that time and, because we had a shortage 
of golf balls, he was a big solid guy, and he would walk ahead of me to stand on the golf balls 
so that no one could find the most of the other guys walked past and I’ll go around and pick 
them out of the ground. So we collected our own golf balls! 
When was this? 
Oh, in our more senior high school years. 
So he was that big guy? 
Yeah, bigger guy the balls were on the ground and when we were short of balls he would 
stand on them with his weight and very has ball on the ground. Pays to pick them out of the 
ground after everyone went past. 
Because nobody could see it! 
We had some interesting times. And we’re still friends to this day. 
Did you continue to play golf for years after high school? 
No, we would like to go back and try playing it again, we haven’t had time. In years I haven’t 
had time. 
So whereabouts was that? 
We had an 18 hole golf course around the school. It started at Magee block and ended up 
around the southern dormitory area, at the back of Centennial Park. 
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E.2. Event 2.1. An event from a wedding 
Yes I had my arm in a plaster. Because I had just had an operation to get my hand rebuilt 
which I had got damaged in Australia when I was working there. So I had to attend a 
wedding as a best man with arm in a sling. Yes, that was were remembered. Yes the 
bridesmaids name was (name). 
Do you remember any particular moment, or anything that stands out to you? 
We had to drink a wine to the bride, a “Here’s to the bride”. And I couldn’t drink with my 
left hand and I spilt all over the place! From then I did no more “Here’s…” to anybody! 
And where was the toast held? Where was the reception held? 
It was held at those rooms down the middle of town on the left-hand side, by Taggerty’s 
where that shop used to be. Something or other rooms. I can’t remember the actual name of 
the rooms but I know their physical location. In the middle of Oamaru, past the statue, second 
on the left. There is a pub restaurant at the front of it and the rooms are in the back behind it. 
The name of the hotel thing. It’s entertainment rooms especially for weddings, at the back of 
the hotel. A side alley entrance and everything. 
You know it! 
I definitely know it! 
E.3. Event 4.3. An event related to a holiday or journey 
Can you recall a particular event or incident that took place on any holiday or journey within 
the last five years? 
Yes, I was sitting in an outside restaurant in Akaroa having a nice cup of coffee, and a bird 
came along and shat on my head. They tell me it was supposed to be good luck but ever since 
then I’ve had bad luck. 
Oh no! Which restaurant was that?  
(silence) 
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Yes, there is a danger with those restaurants out on the promenade and agora because there 
shouted baked tall canopies of trees which are just like long drops for the birds aren’t they! 
Oh, yes, well and truly! 
Isn’t that funny. So, you were sitting outside, did you say that you are enjoying a beverage? 
Enjoying a nice cup of coffee. This buddy bird came along and shat clean on top of my head 
it didn’t just kiss me, it gave me the whole lot. 
Oh gosh. Do you remember which restaurant it was? 
The one as you go around the bend towards, to where the war first, where the key is, where 
the higher the dolphin boats. It was just at the end of that key. Faces northwards. Because as 
you get down the bottom of the town the foreshore goes round the bend and turns right and 
gin you can then carry on that wake or carry on down through to down the pier. 
So it was near the pier? 
Just off the end of the pier.  
That’s hilarious! 
Yes, you’ve got to have a chuckle don’t you. 
It might be good for your hair as well! 
Laughter. 
A bit of organic matter! 
How long ago did this happen? 
Oh, it must have been about 18 months ago or so.  
118 
Appendix F: Example of a memory elaboration session 
Two transcribed excerpts of dialogue from memory elaboration sessions.  
F.1. Example one 
So we now just gonna think back to your time at high school and a particular incident that 
happened at that time.  You mentioned earlier that there was an explosion in the lab 
following an attempt to generate hydrogen.  Can you tell me more about this experiment? 
We um, I think there were three of us in the science class.  This was at Temuka district high 
school.  And we needed some hydrogen for some experiment.  And we had no way of getting 
it so I suddenly remembered that we used to have and experiment which the science teacher 
did alone, where you put a piece of sodium on some water and it bussed around and gave off 
hydrogen. 
Okay. 
So I said well, if we go off and get some sodium we can do this.  Which we did.  And we 
were holding a glass of what you call it a glass canister of some sort,  And as the sodium ran 
round and round we were trying to track it with the glass thing to get the hydrogen in there.  
Because it gave off hydrogen.   
Okay. 
And that the thing fizzed out so we needed a bigger piece so we got quite a big piece and put 
it on… it must have been about 3cm square I suppose. 
What colour was it? 
Umm, it had a sort of orangey colour if I remember rightly.  So round and round it went and 
we had this jolly thing we had to put the glass jar fairly close to get the hydrogen coming off.  
And suddenly there was a bang, And the whole thing blew up!  Fortunately I was wearing 
glasses because you know, I would have got it in the face.  Because we were all crouched 
over the jolly thing trying to do this. So yes there was water all over the floor and it really 
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could have been quite dangerous.  So then we had to go and confess tp the science master 
who was taking a class somewhere else, what had happened! And he said when I left you you 
were doing some perfectly harmless experiment it was fine.  And as soon as I turn my back 
you were… you do this.  I think he was relieved that we were all safe because it could have 
been quite dangerous. 
It could have been quite bad.  Yeah. 
But, so he didn’t reprimand us or anything he just knew we’d failed and we’d made a mess 
we shouldn’t have done it. 
That you’d learned your lesson hopefully!  
Apparently that experiment, we didn’t know, but it had been banned from school.   
Okay. 
And we found that out after. 
Because of how dangerous it was. 
So we hadn’t got to collecting hydrogen to do the other experiment! 
But you certainly created it!   
Oh yes we created some.   
Mm. Can you describe for me again the glass and how you had the sodium in the water? 
We had a basin of water. 
Okay, a basin?  Where was the basin located? 
It was sitting on the bench probably.  
Okay.  So just like a pan of sorts? 
Yeah.  Like that. 
Okay 
F.2. Example two 
Your reception was held in, south east border of London? 
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The wedding took place on the south east border of London in Penge Parish Church but then 
we went over the border to where by the time my wife was staying with relations and that 
was in Kent.  
Okay and so how did you go over the border from south east London over to...? 
By car.  It was only 5 minutes away by car, to her relations. 
Do you recall the trip, what the car looked like? 
No I don’t but I remember what happened just before it, nobody told me that we had choir 
boys because we had a small congregation at our wedding.  And so we had choir boys 
helping us with the singing and church.  Nobody told me however that you throw a heap of 
sixpences in the air for the choir boys to have a coin scramble. 
Oh right. 
I presume they got paid for being there because we got charged a certain amount for having a 
choir, so we presumed therefore that the choir boys got paid.  Now I didn’t know, it’s a 
custom in England, that if you have choir boys you have a coin scramble afterward.  And all 
these hopeful boys were sitting there standing around wondering when the coins were going 
to come!  And they didn’t come!  Yeah so they were disappointed.   
So that was inside the church still? 
Just at the gate of the church entrance, on the street.  
And you saw them standing there? 
Yeah!  I thought it was very good of them to stand and be there for us, as it were!  I thought 
they would have packed up and gone home! But afterwards somebody told me what should 
have been done.  I presumed that they thought that I knew about it anyway.  But I was from 
down under I didn’t know anything about that, nothing like that happened in New Zealand.  
They didn’t usually have choir boys at a wedding! 
Its easy to run into trouble with custom! 
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Yes well there was nothing I could have done about it.  I think now I suppose I could have 
sent them some money and told them to distribute it among the choir boys. 
So the choir boys, what did they wear? 
They wore robes, and from memory they were up in a gallery by the organ pipes. 
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Appendix G: AMI and EAMI semantic memory item schedule 
Organisation of questions for AMI and EAMI semantic items schedule, showing overlap between item questions. 
Early Adulthood (age 18 - early tthirties)
Later Adulthood           
(age 45 - 6  years ago)
Recent Life (within last 6 
years - 12 months ago)
Part 1 (max 5 points) Part 2 (max 8 points) Part 3 (max 8 points) Part 4 (max 8 points) Part 5 (max 9 points) Part 6 (max 4 points) Part 7 (max 8 points)
AMI 1.1. =  S.1.1.1. (2) AMI 2.1. = S.1.2.1. (1) AMI 3.1. = S.1.3.1. (1) AMI 4.1. = S.2.1.1. (1) AMI 5.1. = S.2.2.1. & S.2.2.2. (2) AMI 6.1. = S.2.3.1. (1) ~ AMI 7.1. = S.4.1.1. (1)
AMI 1.2. = S.1.1.2. (3) AMI 2.2. = S.1.2.2. (1) AMI 3.2. = S.1.3.2. (1) AMI 4.2. = S.2.1.2. (2) AMI 5.2. = S.2.2.3. (2) AMI 6.2. = S.2.3.2. (0.5) ~ AMI 7.2. = S.4.1.2. (1)
AMI 2.3. = S.1.2.3. (1) AMI 3.3. = S.1.3.3. (0.5) AMI 4.3. = S.2.1.6. (2) AMI 5.3. = S.2.2.4. (2) AMI 6.3. = S.2.3.3. (0.5) ~ AMI 7.3. = S.4.1.3. (1)
AMI 2.4. = S.1.2.4. (2) AMI 3.3. = S.1.3.3.1. (0.5) AMI 4.4. = S.2.1.4. (3) AMI 5.4. = S.2.2.5. (1) AMI 6.4. = S.2.3.4. (1) ~ AMI 7.4. = S.4.1.4. (2)
AMI 2.5 = S.1.2.6. (3) AMI 3.4. = S.1.3.5. (2) AMI 5.5. = S.2.2.6. (1) AMI 6.5. = S.2.3.5. (0.5) ~ AMI 7.5. = S.4.1.5. (3)
AMI 3.5. = S.1.3.7. (3) AMI 5.6. = S.2.2.7. (1) AMI 6.6 = S.2.3.6. (0.5) ~
~ Part 8 (max 8 points)
 ~ AMI 8.1. = S.4.4.1. (1)
~ AMI 8.2. = S.4.4.2. (1)
~ AMI 8.3. = S.4.4.3. (1)
AMI 8.4. = S.4.4.4. (2)
~ AMI 8.5. = S.4.4.5. (3)
Part 9 (max 2 points)
~ AMI 9.1. = S.4.3.1. (1)
~ AMI 9.2. = S.4.3.2. (1)
~
Part 10 (max 3 points)
~ AMI 10.1. = S.4.2.1. (1)
~ AMI 10.2. = S.4.2.2. (1)
AMI 10.3. = S.4.2.3. (1)
EAMI Semantic Subscale (max 10 points) (max 10 points) (max 14 points) (max 14 points) (max 14 points)
Daily Living 
Name of Association S.1.1.4. (1) S.1.2.1. (1) S.1.3.1. (1) S.2.1.2.2. (1) ~ ~ S.3.4. (1) S.4.4.7. (1)
Location S.1.1.6. (1) S.1.2.2. (1) S.1.3.2. (1) S.2.1.3. (1) ~ ~ S.3.5. (1) S.4.4.8. (1)
Nature of work/study/hobby S.1.1.5. (1) S.1.2.8. (1) S.1.3.3. (.5) + S.1.3.3.1. (.5) S.2.1.2.1 (1) ~ ~ S.3.6. (1) S.4.4.9. (1)
How travelled there S.1.1.7. (1) S.1.2.5. (1) S.1.3.6. (1) S.2.1.7. (1) ~ ~ S.3.7. (1) S.4.4.10. (1) 
Names of People
Full name S.1.1.2. (1) S.1.2.6. (1) S.1.3.7. (1) S.2.1.4. (1) ~ ~ S.3.2. (1) S.4.4.5. (1)
Full name S.1.1.2. (1) S.1.2.6. (1) S.1.3.7. (1) S.2.1.4. (1) ~ ~ S.3.2. (1) S.4.4.5. (1)
Full name S.1.1.2. (1) S.1.2.6. (1) S.1.3.7. (1) S.2.1.4. (1) ~ ~ S.3.2. (1) S.4.4.5. (1)
Relationship S.1.1.3. (1) S.1.2.7. (1) S.1.3.8.(1) S.2.1.5. (1) ~ ~ S.3.3. (1) S.4.4.6. (1)
Relationship S.1.1.3. (1) S.1.2.7. (1) S.1.3.8.(1) S.2.1.5. (1) ~ ~ S.3.3. (1) S.4.4.6. (1)
Relationship S.1.1.3. (1) S.1.2.7. (1) S.1.3.8.(1) S.2.1.5. (1) ~ ~ S.3.3. (1) S.4.4.6. (1)
Important Event Date
Date ~ ~ S.1.4.1. (1) ~ ~ S.2.4.1. (1) S.3.8. (1) S.4.4.11. (1)
Month ~ ~ S.1.4.1. (1) ~ ~ S.2.4.1. (1) S.3.8. (1) S.4.4.11. (1)
Year ~ ~ S.1.4.1. (1) ~ ~ S.2.4.1. (1) S.3.8. (1) S.4.4.11. (1)
Location ~ ~ S.1.4.2. (1) ~ ~ S.2.4.1. (1) S.3.9. (1) S.4.4.12. (1)
(max 14 points)
AMI Semantic Schedule
Childhood (age 0 - 18)
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Appendix I: Examples of avoid events sheets for a PD-active 
group participant interview (upper panel), and a PD-passive 





Appendix J: Secondary data analysis  
The secondary analysis only included memories that were different to those produced at 
baseline. These memories could be spontaneously provided on the first request by the 
examiner; or upon request for an alternative memory, if participants had initially produced a 
baseline memory.  
 For 23 events, participants failed to recall any memories at all and were awarded zero 
scores (HC n=5, PD-Intervention n=7, PD-Control n=5). These are marked as ‘e’ events in 
the Results Table 3-2. The data for these events were treated identically in the main analysis 
reported in the Results chapter. 
 For an additional 17 events, participants produced a ‘baseline memory’ but were 
unable to think of a different memory. These are marked as ‘f’ events. These events were also 
awarded zero scores. The data for these events were included in the main analysis reported in 
the Results chapter. 
 There were an additional 17 events affected by administration error in which the 
baseline memory was spontaneously produced but the participant was not asked to think of an 
alternative event (‘f
1’
 events). Because it was not known whether participants would have 
been able to produce an alternative memory if they had been asked, these event scores were 
re-designated as ‘missing values’. The mean values of the life periods from whence they 
came were re-calculated as a percentage of the remaining two events. 
 Additionally, there were three ‘replacement’ baseline events that were used, because 
an elaborated event was spontaneously provided, and the participant could not think of an 
alternative memory (‘d’ events). These were rescored as zero because they were elicited 
under conditions where the participant was asked to but had been unable to think of a 
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different memory. The original scores for these events were included in the main analysis 
reported in the Results chapter. 
 PD-active event 2.1. (event ‘b’): This event score was re-designated as a missing 
value. This is because it was a baseline event used in memory elaboration sessions, and the 
participant was not asked to think of an alternative memory. This event’s Early Adulthood 
life period score was calculated using the mean percentage score of the two remaining events. 
This event score was treated identically in the main analysis reported in the Results chapter. 
 PD-active event 1.3. (event ‘a’): This event was rescored as zero because even though 
it was an elaborated baseline event, the participant was firstly asked to think of a different 
memory and could not. Events 1.1, 1.2 for this participant are therefore included for analysis. 
For the main data analysis reported in the Results chapter, this event was excluded as a 
‘missing value’ and the life period total was calculated from the remaining two event scores.  
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Appendix K: Autobiographical memory end-of-trial scoring sheet 
Table K-1. Combined EAMI and AMI semantic scoring table used at end-of-trial.  
 
Note. Item S.4.4.5. refers to AMI only. Item S.1.3.4. is relevant only to American users of the interview 
and  was not included in any analyses. 
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Table K-2. Combined EAMI and AMI episodic scoring table used at end-of-trial. 















ago	Event		 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 0	-	5	 5	-	11	 11	-	18	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 E.1.1.	 E.1.2.	 E.1.3.	 E.2.1.	 E.2.2.	 E.2.3.	 E.3.1.	 E.3.2.	 E.3.3.	 E.4.1.	 E.4.2.	 E.4.3.	
Event	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Temporal	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Sensory	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Spatial	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Emotion	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Implication	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Thoughts	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
TOTAL			/	7	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Avoid	Event	Used	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	































TOTALS														/	27	 	 			/	9	 	 	 			/	9	 	 	 	 	 	 			/	9	
	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
EAMI	Autonoetic	
Consc.	 E.1.1.	 E.1.2.	 E.1.3.	 E.2.1.	 E.2.2.	 E.2.3.	 E.3.1.	 E.3.2.	 E.3.3.	 E.4.1.	 E.4.2.	 E.4.3.	
1.				Viewer	
Perspective	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
2.				Continuity	of		
Visual	Imagery	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
3.				Covert	Rehearsal		
of	Memory	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
4.				Emotional		
Re-experiencing	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
5.				Overall		
Re-experiencing	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
